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xABSTRACT
With each new feature size, integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing costs increase. Rising
expenses cause the once vertical IC supply chain to flatten out. Companies are increasing their
reliance on contractors, often foreign, to supplement their supply chain deficiencies as they no
longer can provide all of the services themselves. This shift has brought with it several security
concerns classified under three categories: (1) Metering - controlling the number of ICs created
and for whom. (2) Theft - controlling the dissemination of intellectual property (IP). (3) Trust
- controlling the confidence in the IC post-fabrication. Our research focuses on providing a
solution to the metering problem by restricting an attacker’s access to the IC design. Our
solution modifies the CAD tool flow in order to identify locations in the circuit which can
be protected with reconfigurable logic barriers. These barriers require the correct key to be
present for information to flow through. Incorrect key values render the IC useless as the flow
of information is blocked. Our selection heuristics utilize observability and controllability don’t
care sets along with a node’s location in the network to maximize an attacker’s burden while
keeping in mind the associated overhead. We implement our approach in an open-source logic
synthesis tool, compare it against previous solutions and evaluate its effectiveness against a
knowledgeable attacker.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
A significant security threat has emerged as the once vertical Integrated Circuit (IC) supply
chain has flattened into a horizontal model. In the past, IC design and fabrication were mostly
done by the same entity since the cost to build a foundry, although expensive, was a reasonable
investment. But, as the feature size and time-to-market shrink coupled with the demands for
lower-power, high performance ICs, the cost required to establish a full-scale foundry becomes
prohibitive. In 2005, a full-scale 300mm wafer 65nm process foundry cost $3 Billion to build
with mask creation costing upwards of $2 million [10]. In such a market, very few companies
can afford to be experts in all areas driving the market to specialize. Intellectual Property (IP)
vendors have emerged who specialize in a certain functional unit and license it to others for
use in their Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) designs. The IC design companies
integrate third-party IP along with their own to create an IC design.
Finally, contract foundries have begun to harness economies of scale as they spread the large
capital required to build the foundry among their clients. These contract foundries, originally
driven by cheap labor, established themselves throughout Asia. Now, as labor prices and au-
tomation have risen, the motivating factor for location has diminished. But, the concentration
of expertise is well established in these areas as can be seen in recent trends. According to
the Semiconductor Industry Association, the share of dollars of semiconductors shipped from
the United States was 66.7% of the global market in 1976 while Asia, including Japan only
made up 11.4%. Since then, there has been a steady shift in these trends. As of the end of
the year 2008, the United States dropped to 15.5% of the global market while Asia grew to
69.2%. These trends can be seen in Figure 1.1 which shows a sharp transfer of the market in
the mid-1980s and then again over the last 10 years with a 30% swing [55]. Not only have the
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Figure 1.1: Percentage of dollars of semiconductors shipped over time for America, Europe,
and Asia
dollars shifted power, but the number of foundries along with it. In 2005, 16 out of the 59
300mm foundries worldwide were in the United States, but a majority of the 16 were special
purpose fabrication facilities not tooled for general purpose ASIC design. These changes have
not gone unnoticed as even the United States senate has suggested plans of action [56].
Although the fabrication of ICs is dominated by the foreign market, the IC industry in
the United States is still alive, but its business model has changed in recent years. Large
companies such as Texas Instruments and AMD that once fabricated their own ICs have opted
for the fabless model, contract out their IC fabrication. Others such as Qualcomm, Broadcom,
and Nvidia who all recently broke into the top 20 semiconductor sales leaders are showing
that fabless companies can survive. The paradigm shift has created a serious security threat
as control of a process that once could be monitored closely, is being outsourced. A recent
report by SEMI [2] surveyed companies working in the semiconductor industry representing
more than 50% of the annual semiconductor revenue. Of the respondents, 90% reported the
existence of IP infringement in their company and 54% reported it as a serious or extremely
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serious threat. Without adequate protections schemes, the $1 Billion lost to IP piracy each
day [25] will continue to be fueled by cases such as the fake NEC company [15] and those
reported by [2]. Adaptions to the horizontal model need to be made in order to protect the IP
that is the sole product of some companies and precious to all companies.
The process flow for taking a napkin design and turning it into a completed IC can be seen
in Figure 1.2. The process starts with the IC Designer who creates the Register Transfer Level
(RTL) description of the IC according to the specifications of the project. This description,
typically in a form of a hardware description language (HDL), is the IP of the designer. The
RTL then begins a series of electronic design automation (EDA) steps using software tools by
companies such as Cadence, Mentor Graphics, and Synopsys in order to produce a finalized
netlist. These steps begin with logic synthesis where the RTL design is turned into a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) representation, N = (V, E). The nodes in V each represent a Boolean
logic function and the partial ordering of the nodes cause it to be acyclic. The interconnections
between the nodes represent the flow of information as the output of one Boolean function is
4fed into another node. The inputs to the graph represent the primary inputs to the circuit and
the outputs, correspondingly, the primary outputs.
It is in this stage that logic optimization also occurs. Complex heuristics search for graph
transformations that optimize the design goals of the system in order to increase circuit qual-
ity. These transformations leave the circuit functionally equivalent although, it is structurally
optimized. The optimized design is sent to the mapping stage where the Boolean functionality
of the DAG is converted into primitive gates representing the same functionality. The next
stage takes the mapping library which describes the primitive gates and their functionality
as its input. The mapping phase can be seen as a covering problem where the Boolean logic
making up the DAG must be covered by primitive gates specified in the mapping library. Once
mapping is complete, placing and routing occur. This stage determines the best locations and
best connections between each component of the design. By taking into account the design
constraints of area, delay, and power, optimizations can be made for the location and connec-
tions. At this point, all of the original functionality specified in the RTL stage is present and
there are no violations in design constraints. The design is exported to a layout level geometry
format such as GDSII or more recently, OASIS which are large plaintext descriptions of the
polygons representing the physical descriptions of how the IC should be fabricated.
This exact blueprint, the layout geometry, is sent to the foundry for processing. The foundry
reads the layout geometry and legitimately makes modifications to the polygons in order to
support the design. This could include increasing the width of some polygons in order to
conform to the minimum granularity of etching that the foundry can reliably manufacture.
Once the layout geometry has been modified to conform to all of the fabrication rules, masks
are created which are needed for etching each layer of the wafer. The fabrication process
continues through many stages of manufacturing concluding with the separation of individual
ICs from the larger wafers. Basic tests are performed to bin and sort the ICs before they are
packaged. In packaging, the die is covered with plastic or ceramic and connections are made
from the wafers I/O ports to the metal leads. The final step, IC testing, utilizes the provided
test vectors to ensure quality and consistency throughout the process.
5The concerns that arise from IC fabrication can be split into three basic categories: Meter-
ing, Theft, and Trust. Each of these categories broadly addresses whether extra ICs beyond
the purchase order have been produced, whether information including IP has been gained by
unauthorized individuals, and whether any tampering has occurred in the ICs received from
the foundry. Although solutions in each category are needed and warranted, we chose to focus
on a solution to Metering. Significant research effort has been spent to reduce the growing IC
piracy. Various schemes to uniquely identify ICs, even those produced from the same wafer,
coupled with a method for registering the unique ID of each IC have been proposed. Building
upon the passive metering approaches, more active ones add an additional FSM with replicated
states which requires a unique key pattern to unlock the IC before becoming functional. Other
approaches focus on combinational locking mechanisms by disseminating the FSM throughout
the IC. In each of the approaches utilizing a key, a secure communication framework needs
to be established, usually based on well-known public-key encryption methods. Our approach
provides an improvement to the combinational locking approaches by recognizing several short-
comings of previous schemes.
Where the previous methods did not allow synthesis tools much flexibility and relied on
random selection criteria, our approach raises the level of abstraction to increase flexibility
and opacity, and establishes node selection heuristics that maximize security while minimizing
overhead. Our results show that using a cut-based heuristic selection approach is more efficient
than random node selection and that the selection of additional nodes beyond a single cut, does
not lead to significant gains in security. We have also shown that our approach is resilient to an
intelligent attacker and that our selection heuristic increases this resiliency as its parameters
are tuned.
At a high level, our approach adds reconfigurable logic barriers to the IC before it is fab-
ricated. These barriers completely separate the inputs from the outputs such that every path
from a primary input to a primary output must pass through one of the barriers. This is
analogous to security checks at the airport. The barriers separate all of the terminals from the
outside world. If a passenger wants to enter the concourse, they must pass through security.
6LB LB LB LB LB LB LB LB LB LB LB LB LB LBLB
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Figure 1.3: High level approach for IC piracy protection. Logic Barriers (LB) block the infor-
mation flow (straight arrows) such that only unintelligble data (curved arrows) continues to
flow towards the outputs when the key is incorrect.
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Figure 1.4: High level approach for IC piracy protection. Logic Barriers (LB) allow the infor-
mation flow (straight arrows) to continue through when the key is correct.
8There is no legal path that they can take that would allow them to bypass security. Figure 1.3
and Figure 1.4 visually depict our approach. In both figures, the logic network for the IC is
represented as the graph in green (light gray). The inputs to the circuit are the triangles at the
bottom of the figure and the outputs, the triangles at the top. Each of the circles represents
a piece of the circuit’s functionality with the edges of the graph indicating the connections
between the logic elements. The thick blue (medium gray) arrows represent the general trends
of the information flow as it moves through the circuit. Large straight arrows show data flowing
as it would in the original circuit not augmented with our approach and the curved arrows show
data that has been altered to be unintelligible. In the middle of the figures, red (dark gray)
checkpoint boxes have been placed with red (dark gray) interconnections between the barri-
ers. When the checkpoint is closed as in Figure 1.3, the data becomes skewed and no longer
represents the expected data. When they are open, however, the data is able to flow through
them without being affected. The difference between having the checkpoint gates opened and
closed is the presence of the correct key. Without a valid key, the gate cannot be opened, but
once the correct key has been inserted, the checkpoint allows the data to flow through and the
circuit functions identical to the original unprotected circuit.
Our work addresses: The need for providing barriers to information flow. How barriers can
be efficiently implemented. The best locations for the barriers taking into consideration the
effectiveness and overhead required to obscure the data. Analysis of our barrier implementation
including comparisons with other approaches.
Our contributions include: Proof of concept implementations of hardware Trojans. A com-
binational locking scheme integrated into a standard CAD tool flow to prevent IC piracy. The
first metering scheme that does not disclose the entire schematic to the foundry. Efficient
node selection heuristics for maximizing the security while minimizing the associated overhead.
Analysis of the improvement over previous schemes and its resiliency to attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses related works relevant to
ours. Chapter 3 provides a threat model for the IC supply chain describing where the attacker
can enter and what they have to gain from the attack throughout each of the stages. Chapter 4
9focuses on the background material and a discussion of our proposed approach. Chapter 5 ana-
lyzes the experiments performed and provides quantitative performance measurements. Chap-
ter 6 wraps up the work with a summary of our approach. Also, the Appendix details our
experience creating proof of concept Hardware Trojans.
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CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
Extensive research has been done in the field of IC supply chain security and has been
classified here into three broad categories: Metering, Theft, and Trust. The first category deals
with controlling the number of ICs produced and also limiting access to those ICs. The second
category addresses unauthorized access to information. This may take the form of IP core theft
or access to hardcoded secrets and algorithms, etc. Finally, the third category examines the
level of confidence that can be placed in the artifacts of the IC supply chain as they pass from
one stage to another.
2.1 Metering
Metering, deals with controlling the number ICs produced and for whom they are produced.
Because of the prohibitively high costs to create foundries, contract fabrication facilities are
used to supply a certain number of ICs of a given circuit design. Although the foundry may
produce the requested number of ICs according to the contract, the current supply chain design
does not enforce strict limiting on additional ICs produced which may be sold on the black
market. Current research is attempting to provide methods that allow the IC designer to
control the number of ICs produced or at least the usability of those ICs.
Metering approaches fit into either a passive or an active scheme. The passive approaches
uniquely identify each IC and register that identity. Later, suspect ICs can be checked for
proper registration. The uniqueness is usually derived from an uncloneable manufacturing
variability that is unique for every IC, even those on the same wafer. Both temporal and
spatial uniformity are tainted with the inherent parasitics of the IC fabrication process which
decreases yield, but is exploited for IC identification. Variabilities such as the threshold mis-
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match in MOSFET arrays [43], variability of silicon [44], delay characteristics [38], and Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [24, 32, 51, 61, 64, 66] are all used to uniquely identify an IC. It
should be noted that not all manufacturing variabilites provide adequate security guarantees
[45].
The other approach, active metering, locks each IC until it is unlocked by the IP holder.
Most active metering approaches also utilize an unclonable manufacturing variability to uniquely
identify an IC, but they add an active locking mechanism to render the IC useless until properly
unlocked. In [8], each IC generates a unique ID based on a spatial variability. The ICs are
initialized to a locked state on power up, but can be unlocked by the IP holder who uses the
unique ID to generate an unlocking key. [9] augments this process by replicating states of
the FSM to increase security and by adding a key distribution process. Foundries are supplied
with a set of challenge inputs by the IP holder which they apply to each IC. The response
is securely transmitted to the IP holder who generates a unique unlocking key for that IC.
A secondary security measure implemented in [8], augments the FSM with black hole states.
Once the system enters into one of these states, it can never be unlocked since there are no
valid transitions out of them. These black hole states are triggered by spurious inputs such as
an attacker trying to brute-force the key combinations.
Another notable example of active metering is EPIC [54]. Instead of creating a FSM to
lock the design, XOR gates are scattered randomly throughout the design on non-essential
wires. One of the inputs to the XOR gate is the original wire and the other, one of the bits
of a key. When the correct key is entered, the XOR gates allow the circuit to function as
expected. Conversely, if a bit of the key is wrong, that XOR gate inverts the signal. A key
distribution framework is also established using public-key cryptography. In this framework,
the IP Holder, foundry, and each individual IC generate a set of public and private keys.
Extra logic allows the IC to generate keys and the exploited manufacturing variabilites allow
them to be unique for each IC. Secure channels are then established between the IP Holder,
foundry, and individual IC. The key that unlocks the XOR gates of an IC is encrypted with
the ICs public key before transmission. Extra encryption/decryption steps allow for further
12
levels of authentication. Our approach is similar in the framework that it fits into, but we
focus significant effort on the selection of locking locations instead of randomly picking them.
By designing more sophisticated heuristics for choosing nodes to augment and by raising the
granularity from XOR gates to LUTs, we have not only generalized the key space, but also
increased the burden placed upon an attacker without increasing the number of bits required to
lock the IC. Our approach also does not reveal the entire design to the foundry which removes
the foundries opportunity to reverse engineer the design.
Also extending from [54] is [27], which shifts the order and responsibilities for establishing
secure communication channels, but still utilizes exactly the same XOR locking scheme as [54]
for authentication. Our focus is a bit different from [27] in that we concentrate on the selection
heuristics and not the secure communication channels.
In [12], a FSM is added to the netlist with inputs connected directly to all of the primary
inputs. The FSM is initially locked and can only be unlocked when the correct sequence of
primary input values is entered. The single output of the FSM is attached to XOR gates
dispersed throughout the IC such that a locked FSM will act as unwanted inverters throughout
the logic. The XOR gates are chosen iteratively by greedily selecting the nodes with the highest
fan-in and fan-out cones which intuitively have more effect on the circuit. Our approach also
looks into the intrinsic properties of the circuit for node selection, but uses a combination of
better defined metrics, observability don’t care ODC sets and node positioning, as the selection
criteria. Our metrics are well-known and much more precise than restricting observation to
fan-in and fan-out.
Others have suggested wafer banking where each layer of the IC is fabricated in a different
facility and combined together after production. The cost of this method is prohibitive due to
the large overhead in manufacturing at multiple facilities, the decreased yield associated with
the inability to test the IC at the foundry, and the ad hoc manufacturing process.
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2.2 Theft
The second category of concern in the IC supply chain is theft of information. Although
this category does overlap with metering, it is not necessarily equivalent. Where metering tries
to control who and how many ICs are created, information theft more generally encompasses
gaining information that was not originally intended to be disseminated. The creation of extra
ICs by unauthorized users is one of the direct consequences of stealing the netlist, but other
information such as hardcoded secrets, IP cores, algorithms, etc. may also be the target.
Many different watermarking and fingerprinting technologies have added a unique signature
at varying levels to the IP. This signature allows the IP to be traced through the IC supply
chain and if the IP is stolen, points directly to the source of the leak. The work in this area
is discussed briefly recognizing its main shortcoming. A unique signature does not protect the
IP from theft, except as a deterrent, rather it provides a basis for a litigation once the crime
has been committed.
The most important issues in watermarking are defined by [37]. The authors categorize them
into three areas, copy detection complexity, mark removal vulnerability, and mark integrity.
These issues are discussed in [14] in a more formal manner in order to establish a solution that
incorporates hierarchical redundancy.
The work of [34, 35] targets IP for FPGAs by adding extra LUTs that are used to encode a
long stream of information. This stream acts as the watermark for the IP used on the FPGA
and is specifically tailored for the recipient. A technique called tiling is used to minimize the
amount of placement and routing needed for successive watermarked designs. Tiling partitions
the circuit into sections such that only the modified sections need to be processed by the EDA
tools. The watermarking scheme they use is based on prior work in [36].
A different set of approaches use a state transition graph (STG) that allows specified paths
through the graph to exhibit a rare pattern [49, 50, 67]. This pattern can be uniquely created
and used as an IP watermark. Further extensions to this idea, [3, 4, 5], search the inherent
FSMs of a design for unused transitions and attempt to coincide the extra watermark transitions
with these FSMs.
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Instead of adding extra STGs to the design, the authors of [11, 33] utilize the NP-complete
design space in many of the algorithms that drive synthesis, placement, and routing. By adding
constraints to these optimization searches, unique IPs can be generated without sacrificing qual-
ity since a phase such as routing may choose different connections with equivalent performance.
Later papers improve the result of constraint based watermarking by using DES alongside a
different routing approach [47] and ordering standard cells based on a seed before routing [46].
Another set of solutions, [59, 68] followed by [26], provide a protection mechanism for
IP developed for FPGAs. A mutual authentication of IP modules and hardware platforms are
established where the FPGA is registered with a 3rd party and then the IP in the same manner.
By communicating through the 3rd party, IP can be deployed on a specific FPGA in order to
minimize IP theft. The extension to [59], [26], hardens the communication protocols by placing
less trust on the 3rd party and provides more details and analysis about the IC identification
mechanism.
2.3 Trust
Along with the other two categories, trust in ICs has become a first-rate priority [6]. Clas-
sical validation and verification methods check that a circuit produces the correct outputs for a
given set of inputs while also meeting non-functional requirements. But performing to a specifi-
cation does not ensure an un-tampered circuit. New approaches must guard against tampering
and be able to check for the presence of malevolent circuitry or absence of critical components.
In February 2005, the Defense Science Board released a report entitled the “Task Force on
High Performance Microchip Supply” [10] which examined long-term trust and security in the
microchips used by the United States government. The conclusion of the report was that “ur-
gent action is recommended.” Following this report, a DARPA initiative, Trust in Integrated
Circuits [16], was started to provide more security to the supply chain. The program is broken
into three phases with industry and government support at each step. The phases examine
trust in ASIC designs, trust in untrusted foundries, and trust in FPGA designs respectively.
An independent effort with similar intentions, the NSA program on Trusted Foundries [48], sets
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certain standards that must be established before a foundry can receive a stamp of approval.
The term hardware Trojans broadly describes a category of attacks that adds or removes
circuitry with malicious intent. This category can be further sub-divided to form a hardware
Trojan taxonomy. Trojans may be identified by their physical attributes such as their archi-
tecture, size, and type, their activation characteristics, or how they manifest themselves [71].
Beyond broad category descriptions, [18] applies threat modeling to hardware in order to quan-
titatively assess the risk of each component in a design. Built upon [18], the authors of [60]
add structural checking which examines the components of the IC against malicious ones. Our
work does not deal with hardware Trojan classification, but being able to digest the various
threats that Trojans pose and how they function is useful in designing protection schemes.
Several methods have been proposed which either try to secure the supply chain so that
Trojans cannot enter into an IC or to verify that the received IC does not contain a Trojan.
Although our main contributions do not deal directly with the issue of trust, the hardware
hacking competition we entered, Section 6.2, describes some proof of concepts for adding Tro-
jans into the IC supply chain. Several other works showing proofs of concept continue to spur
the need for such research. In [31], a flexible framework for launching hardware Trojans sits
alongside existing CPU hardware. The Trojan framework allows the malicious user to by-
pass memory checks for privileged access of the memory and to run in a shadow mode where
malicious instructions can directly execute on the processor invisible to software.
In order to thwart such a Trojan insertion, research has focused on establishing a trust model
and framework for building secure systems. In [70], the trust between the layers of an embedded
system from the hardware up through the client software are examined. Many attempts to limit
an attacker’s ability to compromise the system have been made by using a secure processor.
The work of [28] creates an AES cryptography engine using a normal EDA tool flow and a
second design using wave dynamic differential logic in order to obscure the key against side-
channel attacks. Both were fabricated on the same die and their effectiveness against attacks
compared. Other approaches target the architecture of processors, [62, 63, 66, 65], which
first begin with an encryption scheme for trusting main memory under attack [62, 63]. Later
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in [66, 65], the secure processor was implemented in an FPGA and extra levels of security are
added that do not trust any of the peripherals and aim to provide secure services during physical
attacks. These implementations also describe an implementation of a PUF used for off-chip
authentication. In [58], the authors create a multi-layer encryption protocol on a dual-processor
architecture that can handle a compromised processor. The approach relies on different parts
being manufactured at independent foundries with no collusions existing between them. With
that assumption, the architecture is resilient to hardware attacks embedded from one foundry.
Similar to the main memory security approaches of [62, 63, 66, 65], [41] creates a memory
architecture, XOM, for executing instructions from memory while providing copy protection
and tamper-resistance. Later, [40] implements a trusted computing platform on top of the
XOM architecture. Two related approaches, [22, 69], provide a memory security solution by
encrypting the memory and providing an integrity check. In [22], a Parallelized data Encryption
and Integrity Checking Engine (PE-ICE) is described which adds memory integrity checking
to a block encryption algorithm. Then in [69], a one-time pad is used in combination with a
CRC-based integrity checker to secure the memory. Finally, [73], utilizes a shadow memory
that is initialized by a trusted person and then cannot be altered. Calls are checked with the
shadow memory and differences signal an attack. In all of the cited work on secure memory and
secure processors, the authors make the assumption that the IC design process is secure and
the attacker only enters once the system is put into use. We make the opposite assumption,
the foundry and the IC supply chain are vulnerable. Our work is different from the secure
memory and secure processor work because we focus on a different attacker which means
that the approaches are complementary in providing security guarantees for the whole system
throughout its life-cycle.
The work in [72] tries to find a Trojan once it has been added to a circuit by first heuristically
searching for all possible target locations in a circuit design. From the search, a set of test
vectors are generated that stimulate the areas that have a higher probability of containing a
Trojan. By decreasing the large search space in which the rare event triggering a Trojan occurs,
the likelihood of discovering them increases. In [7], the authors utilize side-channel technology
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in order to analyze a few ICs that are known to be good. From this analysis, a fingerprint
for that particular IC is developed. Then, all of the remaining ICs can be checked against the
fingerprint to ensure that they are the same. Their protection relies on a fine enough granularity
of fingerprinting such that a malicious change to the IC will cause the fingerprint to be modified.
Following along similar lines, the authors of [30, 39] create a fingerprint for ICs in order to
ensure Trojan-free circuits by focusing on path delays for identification. Another fingerprinting
scheme, [13], utilizes controllability and observability to identify the least controllable and least
observable nodes, augment the circuit with a FSM to exercise these nodes and then generate a
challenge response pair which corresponds to the outputs observed when a test input is applied
which exercises the least observable and least controllable nodes. Their approach assumes
that a Trojan will be placed on the least observable and least controllable nodes since there
are fewer test vectors which exercise these values and therefore the chances of a Trojan being
identified are smaller. With this assumption, they specifically create test vectors which target
those nodes and check that the outputs are expected for that set of inputs. Our approach
shares some commonality with [13] in that we both utilize the observability and controllability
properties inherent in a circuit, but in very different ways. Where they use it to choose test
vectors for Trojan identification, we use it for node selection in order to combat piracy.
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CHAPTER 3. THREAT MODEL
As a basis for establishing our security guarantees, it is imperative that we establish a
threat model. In order to accurately characterize the attacker, we need to know what the goal
of the attacker is and what resources they have available. As mentioned in Section 2, the goals
of an attacker targeting the IC supply chain are three-fold. Pirate circuits, steal information,
and implement Trojans. Protecting against an attacker trying to achieve one of these three
goals is difficult because of the breadth of the supply chain, but a thorough classification of the
attacker will allow for more pertinent defenses.
3.1 Attacker Taxonomy
Attackers can be classified on the basis of where in the supply chain they attack and then
further subdivided by what access they have to the supply chain. From these assumptions, a
list of what the attacker can gain in terms of the previously stated goals is described. Finally,
the possible protections that stop or hinder the attacker are mentioned although not in detail
as Section 2 covers these approaches. In each of the cases, the attacker may be a mole, a
disgruntled employee, a competing company, a hacker, or a terrorist. We assume that the
attacker has significant resources, but they are limited and that the benefit from attacking the
IC supply chain must outweigh the resources expended. Along with the taxonomy descriptions,
Figure 3.1 shows the stages of the IC supply chain, who the attacker is at each stage, and what
information can be gained in each of the three attacker goals.
19
Design Source code or ideas
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Figure 3.1: A taxonomy of an attacker including what is to be gained and how to protect
against them at various levels of the IC supply chain
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3.1.1 Design Attacker
Who: A design attacker enters the supply chain during the design phase between the concep-
tion of the idea and when the idea has fully materialized in the form of an RTL description.
This attacker has full access to the design files and source code. The attacker is likely an insider
who is given the access intentionally although they may also be a more traditional hacker who
has compromised a computer system.
Gained:
• Metering - With access to the source code, custom ICs can be created. But, the attacker
must have access to the foundry or enough resources to get the IC fabricated.
• Theft - Since the attacker has access to the entire design and source code, IP theft is
trivial.
• Trust - If the attacker has write access, then adding and removing components to the
design is also very feasible. Without that access, analysis can be done on the design in
order to facilitate an attack at a later stage.
Protection: The measures necessary to protect computer systems that store IP are too nu-
merous to mention and are out of the scope of this paper, but hardened security conscious
networks can aid in IP protection. In the same manner, protecting IP from those who design
it is also very difficult. The addition of Trojans may be minimized by careful code reviews and
adequate checks and balances or through the use of tools such as TRUTH [17]. The TRUTH
tool analyzes HDL source code pointing out potentially unsafe structures that may indicate a
potential Trojan. Protecting from a design attacker requires a holistic security policy in order
to minimize the risk. Our work does not deal with this type of an attacker as we assume that
the IP is well protected inside the company that it is produced.
3.1.2 Synthesis Attacker
Who: A synthesis attacker usually appears well before the IP is actually synthesized. By
compromising the computer aided design (CAD) tools or the scripts that run a series of CAD
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tools, the attacker can modify the IP at any level from preprocessing the HDL all the way
to generation of a netlist [53]. Since the attack happens inside the design house on a usually
trusted platform, there is a decreased suspicion for this kind of attack. Also, since the attack
occurs during synthesis, it is very difficult to discover as the logic is embedded into the design
and in some cases the tests may actually verify the Trojans along with the original system.
Also, with the increase in industry acceptance of open-source CAD tools, a synthesis attacker
could compromise a system by hosting malicious pre-compiled binaries or direct modification
of the source code. Finally, much of the process is automated using scripts. These could be
modified by a design attacker through a number of different approaches. It is not a simple
task to change commercial CAD tools, but a design attacker that attacked the CAD software
instead of an individual IP holder would be able to compromise the IP inside the design house.
Gained:
• Metering - Similar to the design attacker, by stealing the IP the attacker could theoreti-
cally create extra ICs if they were willing to pay the price or had the ability to have them
fabricated.
• Theft - The attacker has access to all levels of the CAD tool flow and can steal any
information that exists in the IP.
• Trust - By searching for well-known patterns, the attacker can either add extra logic to
the design or cripple logic such as a random number generator used in cryptography.
With full access to the tool flow, there are many possibilities for attack.
Protection: Because of the prohibitive cost to design all of the CAD tools in-house, there
is a necessary dependence on CAD software creators. A level of trust needs to be established
with the creators of the CAD tools and a holistic security policy established to hinder in-house
tampering of the CAD tool efforts.
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3.1.3 Fabrication Attacker
Who: A fabrication attacker is usually external to the IP designer. As discussed in previous
sections, much of the ICs that are produced in the world utilize contract foundries. After the
IP designer has created, synthesized, placed, and routed their design, they generate a GDSII
or OASIS file to express the physical layout geometry. The file is composed of a large set of
polygons which describe the geometric structures of the IC. This file is then transferred to the
foundry where the physical mask is created and subsequently, ICs are produced. At the same
time, basic input/output specifications are supplied to which the ICs must perform. These
initial functional tests can then be performed at the foundry. In this horizontal model, the
foundry is given the complete design along with its specifications.
Gained:
• Metering - The foundry is given the design layout file from which they produce a set of
masks for IC production. The Non-recurring engineering (NRE) cost of the design and
the mask production are all paid by the IC designer and are the most costly items in the
process. ICs are usually produced in large volumes and once production begins, creating
extra ICs beyond the purchase order is inexpensive and trivial. Current IC fabrication
practice does not incorporate any measures to limit the number of ICs created.
• Theft - With the layout level geometry of the entire design, reverse-engineering back to
a netlist or even further to HDL is feasible, albeit difficult.
• Trust - The foundries have extended opportunity and exposure to the layout level geom-
etry and masks they are tasked to create. Such exposure affords them the ability to add
or remove components to every IC through layout geometry modification. Alternatively,
after the creation of ICs, a select number of ICs may be modified using a Focused Ion
Beam (FIB). This method becomes obsolete as the feature sizes shrink below 32nm, but
more sophisticated techniques may allow IC modification in the future.
Protection: The protection against a fabrication attacker is at the core of our work. Several
research avenues have focused on passive ways to identify the malevolent acts of an attacker,
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our approach restricts their opportunity.
3.1.4 Distribution Attacker
Who: A distribution attacker enters the supply chain after the ICs have been fabricated. They
do not have access to the HDL source code nor the layout level geometry. This type of attacker
is not usually associated with either the IP designer or foundry and could either be one of the
IC distributors or end users. The attacker probably does not have a set of input/output test
vectors, but instead a set of specifications to which the IC is supposed to perform.
Gained:
• Metering - To copy the IC requires reverse-engineering the design to re-establish a netlist
from which ICs can be fabricated. This is a very difficult task and more so with shrinking
feature sizes.
• Theft - Information can be stolen using various methods by either deconstructing the IC
or passively observing the IC through side-channel attacks. These approaches have been
extensively documented, especially side-channel attacks.
• Trust - At this stage of the supply chain, it is very difficult, although not impossible, to
modify the IC. Because of the processing in the previous stages, the attacker is severely
limited in their freedom. The granularity of their options has also been raised and instead
of being able to deal with individual gates as an attacker in previous stages could, they are
forced to deal with a per package or possibly per component level granularity. Although
it is technically feasible to modify individual gates at this level, the practicality of it is
very low and decreases with the advent of each new feature size.
Protection: Besides for the difficulties imposed by small feature sizes, many schemes have
been implemented in academia and commercially to address specific vulnerabilities of this
type. These include anti-tampering packaging, chemical passivation and obfuscation against
side-channel attacks [28].
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3.2 Assumed Threat Model
In order to establish what we are protecting against, a threat model needs to be established.
Our approach assumes the threat of a fabrication attacker who is external to both the individual
IP creators and the IC designer which follows directly from the horizontal contract model that
is widely popular today. Since the attacker enters the supply chain during the fabrication
phase, they have access to the layout level geometry and a set of test vectors for which the
fabricated IC conforms. These were both given to the foundry by the IC designer in order
to facilitate fabrication of the ICs. The attacker also has significant resources temporally,
fiscally and computationally, but their resources are finite. These resources include advanced
technical knowledge of IC design and fabrication, access to a foundry, ability to fabricate ICs,
and advanced reverse engineering tools. Since we are focused on the problem of IC metering,
we assume that the attackers goal is piracy of ICs. The pirate is motivated by either profit or
acquisition of specialized functionality of an IC. In both cases, the cost to pirate the IC must
be outweighed by the piracy potential. In the former case, the profit potential from the sales
of the counterfeit products must exceed the cost of counterfeiting and in the later case, the IC
must be more valuable than simply creating the IP alone or more valuable than the cost to
allocate enough resources to the functionality of a comparable IC for it to achieve comparable
performance.
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CHAPTER 4. INSIGHT AND APPROACH
4.1 Approach Overview
The standard horizontal IC supply chain is vulnerable in the fabrication phase because the
entire IC design and specifications are transferred to the foundry without control for what they
will do with them. It is assumed that the foundry is good so that they will not make extra
copies of the IC, steal information or add a Trojan, but there are no guarantees. We focus our
efforts on hindering an attacker’s ability to pirate ICs. This problem can either be solved by
increasing the trust in the foundry, or decreasing their ability to pirate. In the first case, the
entire IC design and specifications are still given to the foundry, but because of a contractual
agreement, direct supervision of the employees that handle the IP or a system of checks and
balances, the foundry is assumed to be trustworthy and therefore, even though they have the
ability to pirate, they will not. This policy, although better than none, is unacceptable since it
still affords the foundries the same ability to pirate ICs as they originally had. In the second
case, the foundry is assumed to be bad such that the burden for anti-piracy falls not on the
foundries to enforce, but upon the IC designer who can establish certain security guarantees
before the IC design ever leaves their company. We chose to follow the second approach.
In our protection scheme, Figure 4.1, we transfer the control over anti-piracy to the IP
designer who has the most interest in the success of the scheme and away from the possibly
untrusted foundry. In order to do this, we create a scheme where the functionality of the IP,
F (x), is decomposed into two regions, Ffixed and Freconfig. The majority of the design, Ffixed,
is given to the foundry to fabricate in a traditional ASIC design flow, but the reconfigurable
portion, Freconfig, of the design does not leave the IP design house. This is represented as the
key in the figure and is only accessible to the IC designer. Instead of being fabricated as the
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Figure 4.1: Approach overview for combating IC piracy. A subset of the logic is abstracted
before fabrication. Only after the key has been securely distributed can the IC be used.
original logic, Freconfig is fabricated as reconfigurable logic. The withheld Freconfig partition
can be programmed into the reconfigurable locations in the activation stage using a secure key
distribution framework described in Section 4.2. The foundry is not restricted from making
extra copies of the IC, but since they do not know the configuration of the reconfigurable
locations, they are unable to create a functioning IC. They are also able to guess at what should
be in the reconfigurable locations, but as we will show in the following sections, an educated
decision on the choice of reconfigurable locations by the IC designer requires the foundry to
invest more time and resources than are practical in order to discover the correct configuration.
Another way to view our method is that an IC with reconfigurable locations embedded into it
requires the correct key to unlock. If the correct key is not applied, the reconfigurable locations
are not programmed with the correct values and the IC does not function as intended. Only
when the correct key is applied can the IC be unlocked and function as expected. The key then
becomes of utmost importance because it allows the IC to function correctly and is the only
thing stopping the foundry from producing unsolicited ICs.
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4.2 Unlocking Framework
Because of the importance of the key, a distribution framework needs to be established
where the IP designer can securely unlock each IC separately. Our research does not create
any new methods for distribution since several popular methods exist and we focus on the
heuristics of key selection. The choice of frameworks is left up to the IP designer as our work
is not limited to a single method. Their choice is governed by the level of security they require
and the amount of risk they are willing to take in the distribution of the key. The following
sections describe various topics which play a part in the key distribution.
4.2.1 Public-key Cryptography
Cryptography in its basic form involves transmitting plaintext messages from one party
to another such that others cannot see the original plaintext message. The original plaintext
message is encrypted by the sender, transmitted across an insecure medium, and then decrypted
back to the plaintext by the receiver. For many thousands of years this was accomplished with
a symmetric-key algorithm in which the key used to encrypt the plaintext was the same used
to decrypt it. The major drawback of this system is that both the sender and the receiver need
to share the same key which in turn must be securely transmitted.
Because of the many downfalls of this method, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman de-
veloped public-key cryptography in 1976 [19] which was extended by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir,
and Leonard Adleman in 1978 [52]. In public-key cryptography, the need to share a secret key
is removed and replaced with a new system in which the sender and the receiver both have
a public and a private key. The public keys can be shared through untrusted mediums while
the private keys must remain a secret. When one party wants to transmit a plaintext message
to another, they use the receivers public key to encrypt the message before transmitting it
through insecure mediums. The encrypted message can only be decrypted by the private key.
The security of this method comes from the use of one-way functions which make decrypting a
message extremely difficult in the absence of the private key that corresponds to the public key
with which the message was encrypted. It is feasible to guess the right private key with enough
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time or resources, but as the size of the key grows, the difficulty is elevated. In addition to
sending a message that only the owner of the private key can decrypt, the message can also be
signed so that the receiver knows the origin of the message. If the sender encrypts the message
with his private key and the receivers public key, then the receiver who uses their private key
and the senders public key to decrypt the message knows from whom the message originated.
This type of public-key cryptography is widely used today.
In the context of our metering scheme, public-key cryptography is used in order to establish
secure communication channels for the transmission of the configuration used to program the
reconfigurable locations. Each IC that is locked uses the same configuration for the reconfig-
urable locations as it is too expensive, on the order of millions of dollars, to change the masks
per IC. It is also desirable to be able to meter the production on a per-IC level which implies
a unique unlocking key for each IC. For this to work effectively, each IC needs to be able to
generate a unique random public and private key pair in order to be able to participate in
secure communications. On one hand the goal of IC fabrication is to minimize variations and
produce identical ICs. On the other hand they need to be unique so that they can be metered.
Years of tuning the IC fabrication process provides the first criteria and hardware true random
number generators or physical unclonable functions (PUFs) can be utilized to fulfill the second.
4.2.2 IC Identification
In order for the IC to generate a unique random public and private key pair, each IC
must distinguish itself in some way. Although the IC process attempts to fabricate each IC
identically, manufacturing variations occur which cause the ICs to be slightly different even
on the same die. While these variations sometimes cause the ICs to be different enough to
merit separation as in the case of CPU binning, they usually are within specifications for the
design. But, these slight differences can be exploited as a means of identification. The first
step in being able to generate a set of keys is to be able to establish uniqueness at a per-IC
level. The process by which the unique qualities of an IC are extracted is usually referred to as
a Physical Random Function or Physical Uncloneable Function (PUF). The method by which
29
the uniqueness is realized is what differentiates the following approaches.
In [43], the authors observe that the impurity dopants found in silicon cause MOSFETS
to have slight variances in drain currents. By using an addressable array of MOSFETS, an
identification system can be created. In a similar manner, the authors of [44] utilized the
variations in the grains of polycrystalline silicon thin-film transistors to identify an IC. The
slight differences in the grain boundaries of the polycrystalline silicon cause slight current
differences which are exploited to determine uniqueness. In [24, 38], various gate level structures
are created to compare signals along various paths. A specialized PUF described in [32, 61]
exercises the instability of a cross-coupled inverter, similar to those used in the creation of
flip-flops and SRAM cells. The variations cause the PUF to tend to one of the two stable
operating points. By adding a series of these structures, a unique identifier can be created. It
should be noted that not all manufacturing variabilites provide adequate security guarantees
as shown in [45].
Even though exploiting the random characteristics of manufacturing can produce a unique
per-IC identification, it still has not produced a suitable key for public-key cryptography. In [21,
42], the authors addresses this issue by adding error correction units to increase the consistency
of the output from the PUF. Specifically geared toward ICs, [64, 66] perform the correction
operations and use the results to feed a key generation unit that is seeded by the PUF.
4.2.3 Key Distribution Schemes
The key distribution is flexible in what is to be communicated, with whom, the minimum
security guarantees, and maximum resource budget. Some possibilities have been proposed
in [27, 54] but the ultimate choice is left to the user. The distribution scheme in [54] uses three
key parties, the IP holder, the foundry, and the individual IC. Each one of these must generate
a public and private key pair; the IC through the methods described in Section 4.2.2 and the
other two using well-known software approaches. The public key is shared with all parties and
then the IP holder can encrypt the correct configuration of the reconfigurable locations with IP
holder’s private key, the ICs public key, and the foundries public key. This encrypted message
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is transmitted to the foundry who is the only one that can receive the message by using their
private key. The result is sent to the intended IC which can decrypt the message using the ICs
private key and the IP holders public key. The final result is the plaintext configuration that
will unlock the IC. It should be noted that the plaintext configuration is the same for all of the
ICs fabricated from the same mask, but the transmission from the IP holder is encrypted with
a specific ICs public key. This allows the IP holder to maintain control of which ICs are being
activated.
In [27], the authors start with a different focus and trust model while still utilizing a key
distribution scheme. Instead of withholding part of the design, the authors hardcode the
configuration on the IC, but require a certain condition before the configuration is activated.
This is comparable to the FSM locking seen in Section 2. The public key of the IP holder is
also hardcoded on the IC. A user who wishes to be authenticated in order to use the IC must
generate a secret key known only to themselves. This secret key is taken as an input to a PUF
on the IC which generates a random value that is unique to both the IC and the input key. This
means that changing either the IC or the key will change the value generated by the PUF. The
IC can then encrypt the value with the public key of the IP holder so that only the IP holder
knows the value generated by the PUF. The user must then be authenticated with the IP holder
and establish a secure communication channel using any of the numerous well-defined methods.
The IP holder can then transmit the output of the PUF back to the user of the IC to be used
as a second input to the IC. When the IC verifies the input value and the value generated from
the PUF match, the IC can be unlocked and the correct configuration loaded. This mechanism
gives the IP holder control over authenticating a user and authenticating which IC that user
can use.
Various key distribution schemes can be constructed which, at the core, deal with how
to securely unlock a specific IC so that it can be metered. But, every distribution scheme
becomes worthless if an attacker can easily generate the unlocking pattern themselves. It does
not matter how well protected the transmission of a secret is if the secret can be discovered
independently of the transmission. Because of this reasoning we focused our efforts on trying
31
to increase the security of the reconfiguration independent of any distribution model while at
the same time minimizing the overhead associated with this type of locking mechanism
4.3 Key Creation
The previous combinational locking schemes [27, 54] both used 2-input XOR and XNOR
gates as their primary gate abstractions. The gates were inserted on wires throughout the
design with one of the inputs a single bit of the key and the other, the original wire value the
gate interrupted. Their choice of wires for gate placement was random with a small provision
for avoiding the critical path. Although this does yield some level of security, we propose
a method with better security and minimized overhead. To meet this end, the level of gate
abstraction is raised from the single XOR and XNOR gates to a k-input LUT. The selection
criteria is also improved by creating a heuristic algorithm focused on selecting the best set of
nodes.
4.3.1 Gate Abstraction
The choice to use LUTs instead of XOR gates was based on a couple of factors. First, even
though the XOR scheme effectively locks the IC, the entire design is still present in the IC.
The XOR gates serve to cripple the design by acting as inverters when incorrectly guessed key
bits are used. In the case of the LUT, not only is a locking mechanism provided, but only
a partial design is exposed to the foundry. Where the XOR schemes use extra logic to lock
the IC, our approach uses part of the original design as the key. As the feature size shrinks
reverse engineering a design from a fabricated IC is increasingly difficult, but it is still very
viable from a layout level geometry. By only using XOR gates, it is possible to extract the
circuit netlist and then simply remove the XOR gates. It is also possible to use a process such
as FIBing where additional wires are added to bypass the XOR lock. Although it is not trivial
to carry out either of those approaches, we prefer to not leave it as an option. The LUT based
approach does not use additional logic, but instead replaces some of the original logic which
forces pirates to exercise the key space in order to unlock the IC.
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Figure 4.2: Schematic of a 3-LUT implemented using SRAM cells and 2:1 muxes
4.3.1.1 Overhead
The overhead that is associated with our approach must be taken into consideration. The
overhead comes in various forms including area, power, and delay where each is dependent on
the number of transistors required to implement the approach.
A LUT can be implemented as an array of SRAM cells with a MUX tree to select the
particular array location. In our case, we are always dealing with a k-input and 1 output
function. Since a k-LUT has 2k possible combinations of inputs, it also requires 2k SRAM cells
to store a 1-bit output for each combination. A mux must also accompany the SRAM cells
in order to choose the appropriate output. This can be accomplished with a multi-level 2:1
mux tree or 2k − 1 2:1 muxes for each k-LUT. Finally, k inverters are needed to generate the
inversion of each input signal. Each of the SRAM cells require 6 transistors, the 2:1 mux, 4
transistors, and the inverters, 2 transistors. In total, a k-LUT requires 10 × 2k + 2 × k − 4
transistors to be implemented. The XOR scheme requires 2 transistors per XOR, but there
are many more XOR gates than LUTs and the XOR gates are in addition to the original logic
while the LUTs implement part of the original logic.
Since the LUT is assuming some of the logic inside its functionality, the transistor count
overhead must take into consideration the logic it is overlapping. The amount of logic that the
LUT represents is dependent on the mapping algorithms and how the logic was partitioned.
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The LUT can take the place of any k-input, one output function which may be as simple as a
set of wires or a more complex Boolean expression. Because of this, it is difficult to say exactly
how many transistors are replaced by the LUT. The overhead of a single LUT compared to the
original design is can be expressed as
(10× 2k + 2× k − 4)− (LUT Function Transistor Count) (4.1)
Also, since the XOR gates in the XOR scheme are strictly overhead, the LUT based approach
requires
(((
10× 2k + 2× k − 4
)
− (LUT Function Transistor Count)
)
×
n
2k
)
− 2× n (4.2)
more transistors than the XOR approach. In this equation, k is the size of the LUT and n is
the number of key bits required. In order to make a comparison of the transistor overhead, we
assume that the LUT does not replace any functionality and is therefore completely overhead.
This is not the case in practice and would negate the logic exclusion property mentioned in
Section 4.3.1, but it does give a general comparison. For this case, comparing the LUT based
approach to the XOR approach while keeping the key bits the same for each shows that the
LUTs use approximately 5 times the number of transistors for all configurations of key bits
and k-input LUTs.
Area scales approximately linearly with transistor count. Looking at Equation 4.1 and
Equation 4.2 the amount of extra area required to implement the design can be calculated
approximately by adding the same percentage of area to the original design as the percentage
of transistors increased from these equations. The area overhead is often not the critical factor
in ASIC design and its cost must be weighed against the security benefits of the approach.
The delay overhead is how much the delay from the inputs to the outputs is lengthened.
Since a LUT is an array of SRAM cells followed by a MUX tree, the longest path is through an
inverter and the mux tree. For a k-input LUT, the height of the MUX tree is log2(SRAMCells)
and there are 2k SRAM cells so the longest path is k+1. For the XOR gate, the delay is always
a constant value of 1. But, just like the transistor count, the delay must take into account the
logic that the LUT has absorbed. It is also difficult to compare the two approaches since there
34
is no guarantee that the delays are all independent from the others and instead my accumulate
on certain paths. Our approach does minimize this by selecting nodes along a cut instead
of randomly, but if the budget is large, more than one cut may be used. Like the transistor
comparisons, by assuming the worst case delay through the LUT and no logic is replaced by
the LUT, the LUT based approach has n
k
more unit delays than the XOR based approach for
the same number of key bits.
Both static and dynamic power combine to form the overall power requirement of a circuit.
Static power is a function of transistor count which was calculated in Equation 4.1 and Equa-
tion 4.2. Dynamic power is proportional to the product of the number of switching transistors
and the switching rate. Since the switching rate remains the same, it is dependent on the
number of switching transistors. It is difficult to fully compare the two approaches because
the statistical probability that the transistors switch is application dependent, but a general-
ized comparison can be made. The static power will be larger in the LUT based approach
since there are more transistors. The dynamic power will also be larger in the case of the
LUTs since there are more transistors and they will switch more frequently than the XORs.
Both approaches, however, are configured relatively infrequently, so the power required for
configuration is negligible.
4.3.2 Observability and Controllability
Observability and controllability are two inherent metrics of a logic network and are used
as part of our selection heuristic. A logic network is a acyclic directed graph, N = {V, E},
where each node, vi ∈ V, represents a Boolean function with multiple inputs and a single
output. The edges, E , connect the nodes beginning with the primary inputs and flowing
towards the primary outputs. Significant research has been done on logic networks resulting
in various representations and manipulation operations. In the ASIC design flow, the logic
network representing the HDL description undergoes various optimization steps before it is
mapped into primitive gates that cover all of the functionality that the original logic network
encompassed in the nodes. At one extreme we can view a logic network as a single node
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connected to all of the primary inputs and outputs with one function to represent the entire
circuit. In the other extreme, the single node is broken into many interconnections of nodes
where each node only represents a primitive function.
During logic synthesis, many optimization steps are performed on the logic network. These
steps require analysis of the logic network in order to discover dimensions of flexibility to
perform the optimizations. One such avenue relies on controllability and observability analysis
to determine a set of don’t care conditions, DC. Informally, it describes a set of inputs or
outputs which do not matter to the circuit because the nature of how the nodes of V are
connected. More formally, they are described as follows.
Controllability is a measure of how easy it is to control the inputs of a given node or how
easy it is to generate a specific set of inputs for that node. The set of don’t care conditions for
a node can be defined by including all input patterns that are never produced at that node.
These input patterns form the controllability don’t care set, CDCin. This means that the
more controllability don’t care conditions a node has, the harder it is to control. If a node
only had primary inputs connected to it, then it would be very controllable since every primary
input pattern can be exercised for a circuit and therefore every combination of inputs for the
node. But, a node buried in the logic network may have an input combination that is never
seen even if every combination of primary inputs was exercised. Take for example the circuit in
Figure 4.3a. The primary inputs, A, B, C and D can be exercised with all 24 combinations and
the rest of the circuit responds accordingly. Both gates G1 and G2 are fully controllable because
all four of their input combinations can be exercised. G3, however, is not fully controllable
because it is not possible to exercise all of the combinations of E and F . This can be seen
when E is true, F can never be false because if B is true to make E true, it cannot also be
false to make F false. This means that EF is a don’t care condition for G3 since it will never
occur in this circuit.
Observability is a measure of how easy it is to see a particular set of values on the output.
In the same manner as the controllability, the observability is often expressed by a set of
don’t care conditions or sets of values that describe conditions where the output is never seen,
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Figure 4.3: Example logic network
ODCout. If a node had only primary outputs, the node would be very observable since every
output that the node generated would be observable on the primary outputs. But, if the
output of the node did not affect any other node, that node would not be very observable.
By looking at Figure 4.3a, the observability don’t care set of gate G3 can be calculated. If
either G or D are false, the output of G4 is also false. This means that if D is false, it
does not matter what G is because the output of G4 is fixed. In other words, if D is false,
then the output of G3, G, is not observable. Therefore, D is a don’t care condition for G3
since G3 is never observed when that condition is true. In terms of the primary inputs it is:
G3ODC = ABCD,ABCD,ABCD,ABCD,ABCD,ABCD,ABCD,ABCD. The entire set
of external don’t care conditions is formed by joining both the controllability and observability
don’t care sets, DCext = CDCin ∪ODCout.
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4.3.3 Cut Based Approach
A cut is a partitioning of the logic network into two separate parts such that every path
from a primary input to a primary output must pass through the cut. Each logic network has
many possible cuts and as the logic network grows large, the number of possible cuts grows
prohibitively large even for moderately sized networks. Since the cut separates sets of nodes,
it can be described by either the nodes on the input side or the nodes on the output side. We
choose to describe a cut in terms of the nodes on the input side or in other words the nodes
whose outputs go through the cut. Cuts are used in many of the logic synthesis algorithms and
we also use them in our heuristics. Factoring in cuts as part of the heuristic allows us to choose
nodes that are not just chosen by a greedy algorithm, but have a global outlook. The top
nodes independently ranked by their observability may not be the best set to choose. Instead,
by looking at how various cuts affect the outputs, we are optimizing at a group level in place
of an individual node level. Because complete enumeration of the cuts is not possible as the
logic network grows large, we traverse the network making cuts while keeping the height of the
cut approximately even across the entire network. The first cut enumerated contains only the
primary inputs which can be seen in Figure 4.3b. This cut is labeled by the names of the wires
on the input side through which it cuts, ABCD. The second cut, EBCD, grows the original
cut by one node and then removes any wires which it no longer cuts through. Since B is used
twice, as inputs to G1 and G2, it still remains in the second cut even though it was dropped
from the G1 gate. The cuts continue to advance by one node until the final cut is made of the
primary outputs.
4.3.4 Height
The logic network representing the IC is a directed acyclic graph, N = {V, E}. Each
node, vi ∈ V, has an associated height value that corresponds to its position in N . The
height of vi is the length of the shortest simple chain, < x0, x1, · · · , xn >: ∀ i ∈ [0 · · ·N − 1] :
xi isadjacentto xi+1, starting at one of the primary inputs. This means that the primary inputs
all assume a height value of 0 and one or more of the primary outputs the maximum height
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value. A cut can also be assigned a height value. For our selection heuristics, we calculate this
value by averaging the height of each of the nodes that comprise the cut.
4.3.5 Budget
The addition of LUTs to replace some of the original logic incurs an overhead while providing
a security benefit. As LUTs are added, the performance, area, power, and delay penalty
increase, but so does the security. This can be taken to the extreme in the case of an FPGA
where the performance is poor, but the foundry that fabricates the FPGA does not know what
will be implemented on the FPGA and should not. In order to balance these two conflicting
metrics, a budget needs to be defined which allows maximizing a metric within the budget of
the other. The budget is configurable in order to be adapted for different applications that
require either more performance with a weaker security or a very secure system at the cost
of performance. The heuristic uses either the amount of security needed or the amount of
performance willing to sacrifice.
4.3.6 Selection Heuristic
When choosing locations for insertion of the reconfigurable regions which represent Freconfig,
we want to pick locations that minimize the possibility of the attacker bypassing the regions
or guessing the correct configuration. For our selection heuristic, we use a combination of the
ODC and cut height with the constraint that the nodes are on the same cut in order to choose
the best nodes.
As mentioned earlier, a cut-based approach was used. Logic network cuts completely par-
tition the network into two parts so that every path from a primary input must go through
the cut in order to get to the primary output. Since no path exists that does not go through a
cut, the data must flow through our reconfigurable regions and in doing so be affected by the
configuration of the LUT. If an incorrect LUT configuration is assigned to a LUT, the output
will be affected causing a chain reaction throughout the rest of the network that eventually
causes the outputs to be incorrect. Abstracting all nodes along the cut causes a cumulative
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effect on the outputs with incorrect LUT configurations.
We utilize ODC because intuitively if Freconfig is important, any incorrect configurations
render the circuit more functionally incorrect than a less important region and the region is
necessary in order for the circuit to function correctly. When selecting Freconfig, it is desir-
able to choose nodes that maximize the control by being highly observable over the outputs,
(y0, y1, . . . , yN−1). This means that a change in the node will affect the output more than a
less observable node. This property is useful since we are trying to maximize the difficulty for
an attacker who is trying to figure out the correct configuration of the LUTs. If an attacker
were to configure a more observable LUT with an incorrect configuration, the circuit would
have more of the outputs incorrect when compared to a less observable LUT. In the extreme
cases, if the node was not observable at all, it would not matter what the LUT configuration
was because it would never affect the primary outputs. In the same way, if the LUT was
completely observable, any change in the configuration would corrupt some of the output bits.
The other property of highly observable nodes, especially when their observability is spread
over many outputs, is that by guessing a LUT configuration, less information is gained as small
configuration changes lead to large output changes.
Formally, for the logic networkN = {V, E} corresponding to a function f(x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) =
(y0, y1, . . . , yN−1) with the desired threshold of reconfigurable logic, 0 <= threconfig < 1, a sub-
set Vreconfig ⊆ V is chosen such that
|Vreconfig|
|V| <= threconfig and the observability of the sub-units
Gi in f ,
∑
Gi∈Vreconfig
∑N−1
j=0 min(x0,x1,...,xN−1)
(
∂yj
∂Gi
)
, is maximized.
We utilize height as a metric for our selection criteria. Specifically cuts that are located
nearest to center of the logic network are better than cuts that deviate away from the center
either towards the primary input or primary outputs. The reasoning for this choice can best be
seen by an example logic network. Figure 4.4 shows the placement of LUTs for three different
cuts. For the sake of simplicity only one LUT of a given cut is shown and examined. These
three LUT placements, A, B, and C, are located at the primary outputs, primary inputs and in
the middle respectively. The circuit depicted is also overly simplified as many inputs and output
are replaced by a series of black dots. Much of the network is not shown and instead, dashed
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Figure 4.4: Logic network showing three cut choices at different levels of the network. LUT A
connected to the primary outputs, LUT B connected to the primary inputs and LUT C in the
middle of the network
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lines show the information flowing from the primary inputs towards the primary outputs.
Each of the LUTs have the same ODC score which is the sum of the ODC sets per output.
Since LUT A is connected directly to O1, there is nothing in the ODC set for this output.
For the other outputs, it is not connected so each have the entire input space as their ODC
set or 2M minterms where M is the number of inputs. Therefore, the total score for LUT A
is 2M × (N − 1) + 2M × 0 = 2M × (N − 1) where N is the number of outputs. LUT C affects
two outputs which are guarded by AND gates connected to primary inputs. This means that
for all of the minterms, half of the time the value of the AND gates will be zero which does
not allow the output of LUT C to be observed. This means that the total score for LUT C
is 2M × (N − 2) + 12 × 2
M + 12 × 2
M = 2M × (N − 1). The third LUT, LUT B, affects four
outputs, but because of the gates connected to the primary outputs, the total score for this
LUT is 2M × (N −4)+ 34 ×2
M + 34 ×2
M + 34 ×2
M + 34 ×2
M = 2M × (N −1). It should be noted
that for LUT B and LUT C, the ODC set may be larger depending on what the logic is in
the regions not shown, but for simplicity we assume that the logic does not change the ODC
set. A selection heuristic that only focused on the number of minterms in ODC would have
ranked each of the cuts as equal and would have chosen one of the three LUT configurations
with the same probability, but these choices are not equivalent.
Looking at the LUTs again in terms of controllability and observability, we see that LUT
A is completely observable on O1 and a cut abstracting the final level of logic would contain
LUTs which all were very observable on their respective outputs. Although not strictly true,
the controllability of LUT A is less than other nodes closer to the primary inputs and certainly
not any more controllable than LUT B. We are looking for nodes that are not very controllable
considering our threat model. The attacker is targeting individual LUTs by exercising input
combinations while using different key (KA) combinations in order to see which configuration
leads to the greatest amount of information learned. If the LUT is very controllable, it is easier
to exercise all of the input combinations of the LUT where as if the LUT is not very controllable,
many more primary input combinations must be exercised before the inputs of the LUT are
all exercised. Switching now to LUT B, we see that it is highly controllable since the primary
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inputs are connected directly to the inputs of the LUT. But, it has the same observability score
as the other two LUTs. In general, although not always the case, the nodes located closer to
the inputs have a larger observability score since there are more don’t care conditions. LUT
C, located in the middle of the circuit is neither completely observable for a single output, nor
completely controllable.
We argue that nodes located near the middle of the logic network are better choices that do
not allow the attacker to gain as much information about the circuit as nodes located near one of
the other extremes. In the case of Figure 4.4, each of the three LUTs has the same observability
score, but for most circuits, this would not be the case. The first metric in consideration of the
selection heuristic is the number of ODC minterms, but this metric alone is not sufficient for
determining the best choice. Intuitively, selecting a cut that has fewer ODC minterms since
it is highly observable located at the last level of logic does not make a good partition of the
circuit. On the inputs side, almost the entire circuit exists in its original form allowing the
attacker to concentrate on the last level of logic. By cutting the circuit in the middle, a more
interesting partition is made, allowing both the input and output side to contain approximately
the same amount of the logic network. In these cases, even with the same number of ODC
minterms, the effects are spread over many outputs and not concentrated on a single output
making the attacker’s ability to choose the correct configuration much more difficult. Similarly,
choosing a node located at the primary inputs is not very wise since the attacker can easily
control that LUTs inputs and does not have to search many more input combinations in order
to exercise the inputs, LUT C for instance. For these reasons, we choose to figure the height
of a cut into our selection heuristic.
In order to properly mix the ODC minterm score with the height value, a parameter α
was introduced which tuned the cut selection’s dependence on one of the metrics. With an α
value of 0 only the ODC score was taken into consideration and when the α value was set to
1, only the height was considered.
Description of algorithm for choosing nodes.
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Algorithm 1 Selection Heuristic
for all ni ∈ nodes do
Calculate ODC set of ni
Calculate height of ni
end for
for all ni ∈ |nodes| in topological order do
Add ni to cut
Trim children of ni
CutScore[ni] = α×
∣∣∣maxHeight−2×cutHeightmaxHeight
∣∣∣+ (1− α)× ( cutODCSummaxODCSum
)
end for
Select best cut C
for all ni ∈ C do
Tag ni
end for
4.4 Implementation
The overall tool flow for implementing our heuristics can be seen in Figure 4.5. The blue
(medium gray) boxes represent unmodified steps in the traditional tool flow. The boxes shaded
green (light gray) represent the additional steps integrated into a standard tool flow. On the left
side of the diagram, the IC designer creates the entire design as a RTL description. The logic
synthesis begins with the logic optimization step which takes in the RTL and also optimization
goals. These goals vary significantly from design to design depending on what metric or set
of metrics the designer desires. These may include optimizations for area, delay, and power.
The logic optimization stage is very involved and is implemented in varying degrees in all logic
synthesis software. After all of the optimizations are finished, the original flow would move on
to mapping, but in our modified flow, this is where we begin.
The first step is to calculate the ODC values for all of the nodes in the circuit. As was
discussed in Section 4.3.2, the ODC set allows us to determine the global significance of an
internal node at a per-output level. The height is calculated by a tree traversal and represents
the shortest number of nodes required to pass through in order to reach a primary input.
After the ODC calculation is finished, each node stores this information. The cut calculation
follows the same algorithm that was discussed in Section 4.3.3. By iterating over the nodes in
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Figure 4.5: Tool flow used to create layout geometry from RTL description. Blue (medium
gray) boxes represent standard tool flow. Green (light gray) boxes represent modifications
made by this work.
the network and using the ODC values for every node along the cut, a measurement can be
determined for each cut. This cut metric is the sum of the number of ODC values for each
output of the nodes along the cut. A second metric, the average cut height, is calculated by
averaging the heights of each node in the cut. The next stage ranks all of the cuts according to
the cuts total ODC value and the average height value calculated in the previous step. These
two metrics are weighted with the α parameter to determine the influence of each metric on
the cut score. When α = 0 only the ODC score is considered and when α = 1 only the height
is considered. All other values of α proportionally weight the final cut score. By using the
budget to determine how many nodes can be selected, the top cuts are selected and tagged.
The final step in the modified process overlaps the original mapping stage. Since the tagged
nodes must be mapped to LUTs and not to the ASIC gates which their function corresponds,
the mapping phase has been augmented to map each of the tagged nodes to LUTs. The rest of
the nodes are mapped according to the functionality found in the mapping library. Once the
mapping phase completes, a netlist is generated. This is not necessary for fabrication of the
IC, but allows us to run the simulations shown in Section 5. From this point, the process can
continue as usual where the design is placed and routed according to the design constraints
and finally, a layout geometry file is generated. The foundry can then use this file to fabricate
the ICs.
45
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
This section provides the experimental results obtained from implementing the theoretical
ideas of the previous sections. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, vari-
ous experiments were conducted. These include an examination of how a cut-based selection
heuristic compared to random selection, the effectiveness of a single cut, and a discussion of
how the parameters of the heuristic can be tuned for increased performance. The results of
the experiments are favorable and show that using our tuned selection heuristic on a variety of
professional benchmarks is more resilient to attacks than previous methods while minimizing
the amount of overhead induced. They also highlight the feasibility of integrating security
features into the IC design flow aimed at decreasing IC piracy.
5.1 Benchmarks
All of the benchmarks used in the experiments come from the Microelectronics Center of
North Carolina (MCNC) benchmark suite [74] developed for the International Workshop on
Logic Synthesis. These benchmarks have been widely used throughout the logic synthesis liter-
ature with the technical report describing them cited over 400 times. Out of the benchmarks,
we utilized the combinational multi-level subset, Table 5.1, since our tool flow does not support
sequential circuits and they provided logic-heavy circuits. Benchmarks with very repeatable
and predictable patterns such as memory cells or multipliers are not well suited for our ap-
proach. In these benchmarks, replacing functionality with LUTs does not hide information as
the predicable pattern or ordinary structure already indicates what was abstracted by LUTs.
Also, benchmarks with fewer than 100 nodes were not used because the small node count did
not provide enough information for interesting results to be generated and smaller circuits are
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Table 5.1: Circuit characteristics of the MCNC benchmarks used
Benchmark Inputs Outputs Height Total Nodes
apex2 39 3 14 942
apex4 9 18 11 722
C432 36 7 17 160
C1355 41 32 23 514
C1908 33 25 40 880
C2670 233 139 32 1161
dalu 75 16 24 1131
des 256 245 13 1498
ex5p 8 63 12 527
ex1010 10 10 11 850
i4 192 6 4 101
i7 199 67 3 406
i8 133 81 8 1183
i9 88 63 7 353
k2 45 43 2 225
seq 41 35 11 1020
Average 90 53 15 729
not likely candidates for full ASIC design. For these reasons, twenty logic-heavy combinational
multi-level benchmarks circuits from the MCNC benchmark suite were chosen. Table 5.1 de-
scribes the benchmarks listing the number of inputs and outputs for each benchmark, the total
nodes in the circuit, the number of nodes that were chosen in a single cut using the ODC
heuristic, and the number of nodes chosen by the height heuristic.
The benchmark files are all in the Berkeley Logic Interchange Format (BLIF) which is a
standard logic synthesis description format and can be generated and interpreted by many
common CAD tools. A BLIF file is a textual representation of a directed graph with named
nodes being assigned single output functions. These nodes are wired together by assigning the
output of one node to the input of another. Finally, the inputs and outputs of the entire circuit
are enumerated and connected to the internal nodes.
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Figure 5.1: Tool flow used to create layout geometry from RTL description. Blue (medium
gray) boxes represent standard tool flow. Green (light gray) boxes represent modifications
made by this work. Red (dark gray) boxes represent the specific tool or file used.
5.2 Experimental Setup
Following along with the tool flow in Figure 5.1, the blue (medium gray) stages are the
original flow, the green (light gray) stages are the custom steps added, and the red boxes (dark
gray) are the specific tool that implements the stage. The logic synthesis was provided by
MVSIS and the results feed into three custom steps added to the source code of MVSIS. These
include, calculating the ODC and height values of each node, calculating the cuts, and selecting
the best cuts which are tagged for mapping. Synopsys IC Compiler was used for placing and
routing the circuit in order to generate a layout geometry. In parallel, SystemC simulations
were done on the circuit, post-mapping, in order to conduct the experiments.
MVSIS, [23], is a popular open-source academic tool produced by the University of Califor-
nia Berkeley used to perform logic synthesis and mapping. MVSIS is an extension to SIS, [57],
also developed by Berkeley, that adds support for multi-valued logic synthesis. The MVSIS
tool reads BLIF format benchmarks and performs a user specified set of optimizations to the
logic network. The optimized network can then be mapped and written to a netlist format.
Our work augments these steps with separate passes over the logic network in order to identify
and tag the best nodes according to the cut-based heuristic in Section 4.3.6. The functional
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Figure 5.2: Heuristic selection vs. random selection for all benchmarks. The thin lines represent
individual benchmarks and the thicker line the average of either the heuristic selection in blue
(medium gray) or the random selection in red (dark gray).
netlists produced post-mapping were simulated using SystemC [29]. SystemC is a system de-
scription language based on C++ used to model and simulate the IC. By exercising billions of
simulation test vectors, the changes that occurred under various LUT configurations could be
observed. Both the generation of netlists and the simulation process were all automated such
that a set of benchmarks could be specified, netlists generated for various parameters, each
netlist simulated, the results recorded, and graphs plotted.
5.3 Experiments
5.3.1 Heuristic Selection vs. Random Selection
In previous works, [27, 54], nodes were chosen at random to be replaced by LUTs. Our
work uses a selection heuristic in order to select the nodes for replacement and in doing so,
is more effective. In this experiment, the effects of random selection and heuristic selection
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are compared. As a metric for performance, we consider how closely the outputs of a circuit
match the expected outputs, their hamming distance. The hamming distance is measured by
the number of outputs that are incorrect, but has been normalized to the percentage of outputs
incorrect in order to compare benchmarks. Therefore, if the hamming distance is 0% then for
every input set, the outputs match the original circuit and conversely if the hamming distance
is 100%, then all of the outputs are inverted for every input set.
For each of the benchmarks, various percentages of nodes were selected from 0% to 100%
in increments of 1%. Two passes were performed at each percentage in order to generate two
netlists or 202 total netlists. The first netlist pass replaced logic elements with LUTs according
to the selection heuristic in Section 4.3.6. The second pass replaced the same amount of
logic, but instead of utilizing the heuristic selection, it chose random nodes. The netlists
were converted into SystemC and a functional simulation run on each netlist. The simulation
assumed that the configuration values for the LUTs were unknown in both cases since the
attacker randomly guessed LUT configurations and randomly guessed input combinations, but
they knew what the expected outputs should be. A more effective attacker who uses targeted
attacks instead of brute force attacks will be considered in following experiments.
For each netlist, 221 input combinations were generated with the LUT values changing
every 1000 iterations. For each input combination, the outputs were checked to see how closely
they matched the expected outputs and a hamming distance score was assigned. The hamming
distances were averaged over every input combination to determine an overall score for that
netlist. Since we are trying to obscure the logic network such that an attacker cannot gain
information about the configuration of the LUTs, it is desirable to have a large hamming
distance. Overhead is also a concern, so minimizing the number of nodes replaced by LUTs
allows for less performance penalties. These two metrics conflict as 0% selected nodes would
be the original circuit, have the least amount of overhead, but no security and 100% of the
circuit replaced with LUTs would be very secure, while maximizing the overhead. It should
also be noted that a completely random circuit will generate output values of ones and zeros
with the same frequency and therefore be correct, when compared to the functionality of the
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circuit under test, approximately 50% of the time. This makes a model building attack more
difficult since the attackers burden is increased with a randomized circuit when compared to
the expected outputs as there is no bias for them to build from. It is therefore desirable for a
given benchmark to have a hamming distances close to 50% and to climb to that percentage
quickly as the percentage of total nodes selected increases.
Figure 5.2 shows the results of the simulations for all of the benchmarks. In this graph,
the red (dark gray) lines represent the random selections and the blue (medium gray) lines,
the heuristic selections. Each one of the thin lines represents a single benchmark consisting
of 101 data points, one for every percentage of gates selected. The thinker lines are 6th order
polynomial trendlines fit to the heuristic selections and the random selections respectively.
These lines represent the general trends of the heuristics compared to the random selection and
help to distill the large amount of information presented. The hamming distance of the heuristic
selection trendline climbs more quickly towards 50% than the random selection showing that
it requires a smaller percentage of the gates to be replaced with LUTs in order to obscure the
design. Even though the trendline for the heuristic selection does not reach 50% hamming
distance until slightly after 40% gate selection, for the majority of the heuristic netlists, they
rise up to 50% before 20% and a few lagging benchmarks drag out the plateau. These numbers
correspond to the location of the first cut and will be discussed in details in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.2 Single Cut Selection
As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, the percentage of gates selected and the overhead for selecting
gates are conflicting metrics that must be optimized in order to get an acceptable hamming
distance. In Figure 5.2, it was observed that the point at which each of the benchmarks reached
a 50% hamming distance score was very near the point when the selection heuristic finished
selecting a single cut of the network. After that point, the hamming distance remained almost
constant as the number of gates selected increased. This occurs because once every node of
a single cut has been chosen, the entire network is separated into two networks with a series
of LUTs in the middle causing all of the paths from inputs to outputs to go through a LUT.
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Figure 5.3: Single cut experiment for all benchmarks. The red (dark gray) bars represent the
hamming distance of a single cut and the blue (medium gray) line, the percentage of total gates
selected in a single cut.
Without having the correct configurations, the propagated inputs are obscured in the LUTs
and lead to incorrect output values. Figure 5.3 shows how the benchmarks are affected by a
single cut heuristic selection. For each benchmark, two data points are shown. The red (dark
gray) bar chart represents the hamming distance observed for a single cut heuristic selection.
Overlaying the bar chart is a blue (light gray) line graph representing the percentage of gates
selected in order to replace an entire cut. The hamming distances for a single cut are very
good and for every benchmark are within 0.1% of being at 50% with some slightly above.
The percentage of gates selected is also very low for most of the benchmarks, especially apex2
(0.42%), apex4 (2.63%), dalu (1.41%), ex1010 (1.18%) and seq (3.43%). On average a single
cut requires 8.08% of nodes to be selected. Additional overhead is introduced due to the reduced
controllability and observability. If only k of the n input nodes of the cut are controllable, the
multiplicative factor for each of input to output relation is 2n−k. In the same way, if the sum
of the observability of the m nodes of the cut, q, such that q < m, the multiplicative factor is
2m−1. This means that a single cut is sufficient to make the circuit act as random logic while
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Figure 5.4: Percentage of information learned as a function of α for all benchmarks. The thin
lines represent the individual benchmarks and the think line, the average over all benchmarks.
only requiring a small percentage of the logic to be abstracted as LUTs. For all of the following
experiments, the heuristic selection uses a single cut across the benchmark for the selection
criteria.
5.3.3 Cut Height
Section 4.3.4 showed why cuts located near the middle of the circuit in terms of height are
better than cuts located towards either of the extremes. In this experiment, we show empirically
this is the case. To add a height factor, a parameter α was introduced into the heuristic selection
criteria. The heuristic selection, explained in detail in Section 4.3.6, is a weighting parameter
that represents the ranking heuristic’s dependence on the ODC and height values. If α is set
to 0, only the ODC values of a cut are considered and if it is set to 100, only the height is used
to determine cut ranking. All α values in between proportionally weight each of the criteria in
the decision. For the previous experiments, α was set to 0, but as will be shown in this section,
α can be tuned for more desirable results.
In this experiment, the same benchmarks were used with the percentage of gates fixed
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(c) C1908
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(e) ex5p
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of information learned as a function of the number of input vector guesses
for six benchmarks, Apex2, Apex4, C1908, C432, ex5p, seq. Series names correspond to
the α value which led to the cut selection.
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to a single cut since Section 5.3.2 showed that selecting more gates than a single cut was
unnecessary. For each of the benchmarks, the value of α was varied from 0 to 100 reflecting
complete dependence on the ODC value at one end and the complete dependence on height
at the other extreme. At each of the 101 increments, a netlist was generated such that the best
cut was selected using the α parameter. Since α is a weighting parameter, it does not mean
that 101 unique cuts were selected and in fact on average only 5.68 unique cuts were selected
per benchmark. The number of unique cuts per benchmark can be seen in Table 5.2. For each
of these unique cuts, a simulation was performed to measure how much information could be
gained about the configuration of the LUTs in the circuit.
For this experiment, we assumed a smarter attacker than the previous ones. The new
attacker is able to determine if the outputs of a circuit are expected given a set of inputs. This
would correspond to an attacker understanding what the circuit is supposed to do, but not
how it works. The attacker is also aware that a logic replacement scheme has been used and
that instead of treating the LUTs as one large key space, targets individual LUTs. We model
this by allowing the attacker to repeatedly configure one LUT while holding the rest constant
and observing how closely the outputs agree with their expected values for known test vectors.
When the LUTs are treated as completely dependent, the key space size is 2(2
K×N) where N is
the number of LUTs in the circuit and K is the size of the LUTs. If each LUT was independent
of the others and could be solved individually, the key space would be reduced to 2(2
K) × N .
But, as will be shown in this section, with smart choices of nodes, the LUTs cannot be treated
as independent.
For each of the unique cut netlists, the simulated attacker attempted to solve the LUTs
individually. Each LUT was initially configured with all zeros and then iteratively LUTs were
chosen and every possible configuration, 2(2
K), was tried while the other LUT configurations
were held constant. For each configuration tried, 211 input combinations were exercised and the
information learned for each configuration recorded. The information learned was calculated as
the percentage of outputs out of the number of possible outputs correct, ouputsCorrect
(outputs×211)
. Out of the
2(2
K) configurations, the one that led to the most information being learned about the circuit
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was chosen. The process repeated with a different LUT while the best guess configuration of the
previous LUT was fixed. The process continued through each LUT and then re-iterated over
the LUTs until 400,000,000 different LUT configurations were tried. This number was chosen
because it allowed the largest benchmark to complete a single iteration through the LUTs. This
number is also sufficient because as Figure 5.3 shows, as the number of configuration attempts
increases the amount of information learned plateaus for all benchmarks and most, well before.
Again, these numbers are further amplified by a reduced controllability and observability.
Figure 5.3 also shows how α affects the amount of information learned. Since our metering
approach tries to minimize the possibility of an attacker figuring out the key value, we want
to choose nodes for LUT replacement such that it minimizes the amount of information that
the attacker can learn about the circuit making it more difficult for the attacker to replicate
the design. Therefore, we would like to see the amount of information learned by the attacker
level off at a low percent. For each of the six graphs in Figure 5.3, several lines are graphed
each representing a unique cut. Since 101 unique cuts are not generated, the α value represents
the first in a range between that value and the next listed α value. From each of these charts,
the α values which levels off at the lowest information are located near 50 while the ones that
level off much higher are closer to one of the extremes, 0 or 100. This means that a good
balance between the ODC and the height, around 50%, when computing the cut scores yields
a cut that is more resistant to the attacker modeled in this experiment then other weightings.
The plateau effect shown in these figures is very beneficial because it means that even an
attacker with infinite time and resources who attacks as we modeled will not be able to gain
100% information. The attacker is forced to either brute force the key or determine a different
manner in which to crack the key value.
Figure 5.4 aggregates the data from all of the benchmarks. In this graph, the thin lines
represent one benchmark as the value of α is incremented from 0 to 100. The steps occur since
not all of the α values produce unique cuts which means many α values yield exactly the same
circuit. The average of all of the benchmarks is plotted as the thicker red line. The line shows
that the amount of information learned decreases as α increases until α is just past 50 at which
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Table 5.2: Experimentation details of the MCNC benchmarks used
α = 0 Best Best Cut α = 100 Unique Key
Benchmark Nodes α Nodes Nodes α Cuts Length
apex2 4 50 135 140 8 1848
apex4 19 48 192 198 15 1082
C432 7 50 33 39 6 280
C1355 32 51 64 74 2 576
C1908 25 42 91 101 7 216
C2670 131 53 135 272 4 778
dalu 16 48 70 89 3 440
des 245 51 459 459 3 4184
ex5p 63 56 169 257 10 2478
ex1010 10 51 103 103 7 296
i4 6 51 33 33 2 82
i7 67 51 275 275 2 1416
i8 81 46 430 430 3 1154
i9 63 44 202 202 3 2152
k2 44 45 98 210 6 2056
seq 35 62 293 317 10 3242
Average 53 50 174 200 6 1393
point the line slowly increases. There is a sharp drop in the curve when α is near 50 dropping
down to 66.4% for α = 53. The information learned fluctuates within a few percent around
this value as dropping to that level twice in the 60s, once in the 70s and then also in the 80s
before rising as α approaches 100. This means that an α value that is a minimum would be a
good choice, a value slightly above 50.
From these experiments, we can see that our node selection heuristic outperforms the ran-
dom selection of previous approaches. We observed that by separating the logic network into
two parts with a cut yields the best results for the amount of overhead it introduces. Also, by
introducing an extra parameter, α, which weights the height of a cut along with the number of
ODC minterms, the quality of the selection was further increased.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Summary of Results
This work began with some implementations of Trojans in an IC supply chain. These proof
of concepts showed that it was feasible to insert Trojans into HDL source code in order to leak
information, cause a denial of service and to utilize the IC for a function it was not intended.
This work was part of our teams first place entry in the CSAW design contest. A thorough
literature survey led to our taxonomy of attackers in the IC supply chain. These classifications
are useful in understanding the bigger picture of vulnerabilities and allow us to establish a
location inside the framework of the bigger picture.
The main contribution of our work is an active metering solution to IC piracy that is more
secure and has less overhead than previous attempts. Our combinational locking scheme parti-
tions an IC circuit design into a fixed and reconfigurable region before fabrication. The foundry
never sees the configuration destined for the reconfigurable regions, but instead fabricates them
onto the IC with facilities to configure post-fabrication. In this way, part of the design is with-
held and acts as a key to unlock fabricated ICs which are useless without proper activation.
Our approach augments the traditional CAD flow with an additional pass over the logic net-
work in order to partition the network into the two regions. Our cut-based node selection
heuristic utilizes a combination of ODC analysis and height metrics in order to select the nodes
that increase the security guarantees while minimizing the overhead. The chosen nodes are
abstracted as reconfigurable LUTs which allows the CAD tools a large design transformation
space.
Our active metering solution was implemented in open-source CAD tools and tested using
a popular set of benchmarks. Automated experiments were run to demonstrate how much
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information an intelligent attacker could gain from attacking an IC protected by our approach.
Our results showed that our heuristic selection was better than previous random node selec-
tion schemes and that a single cut provided the best protection to overhead ratio. We also
demonstrated the effects on information leaked by tuning the heuristic selection parameters.
6.2 Future Works
Although our work has created an effective IC metering scheme and shown considerable
improvements over past work, there is room for future work. Section 4.3.1.1 quantified some of
the overhead associated with our approach, but a more thorough investigation of the overhead
including area, power, and delay characteristics would be useful. The results from the overhead
could be used to drive the selection heuristic or other metrics could be considered for inclusion
which could increase security or decrease overhead. This could include provisions for the nodes
located along the critical path or consideration of the application in which the IC is used such
as the resource constraints of embedded systems. The implementation of our heuristic in the
CAD tools could be optimized in order to support the processing of larger circuits in shorter
time. A better understanding of what architectures are well suited for our approach would be
useful. This information could be used in the selection heuristic in which large designs where
partitioned according to their architecture and certain styles targeted for selection. Several
possible attacks on our approach were suggested and tested, but other more effective ones
may exist. The use of reduced order binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs) may be useful in
solving the unknown LUT configurations. Using ROBDDs would allow an attacker to compare
networks created from incorrect configurations in order to make educated guesses on the next
configuration to try.
Our solution used LUTs as an abstraction for the functionality of targeted nodes of the logic
network. Another avenue could be to explore the abstraction of non-functional characteristics
including delay, area, and power. For example, instead of hiding the logic of a circuit, the delay
characteristics could be hidden such that an incorrect key value would cause the delay to be
skewed and effectively cause the functionality to be affected. Another structure could be added
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to the IC design which would not allow multiple LUT configuration attempts or which would
cause permanent damage to the IC with incorrect configuration attempts. Such approaches
could also be used in combination with the existing one in order to be more effective.
Other points in the supply chain where an attacker could enter are an open avenue to
explore. Our approach focuses on IC metering, but as discussed in previous sections, there are
many attack avenues. Research at various levels may allow for a more elegant and broader
solution than just patching existing ideas together.
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APPENDIX PROOF OF CONCEPT
In the fall of 2008, the Computer Security Awareness Week (CSAW) Embedded Systems
Challenge [1] was held at the Polytechnic Institute of NYU. This competition highlighted some
of the vulnerabilities of the IC supply chain in the form of a hardware hacking challenge. The
story-line for the challenge began with the creation of a new cryptographic device, code named
Alpha, for a fictitious army. The Alpha device allows soldiers to type messages and transmit
them securely to other soldiers and their command station. The HDL design for the device has
been leaked through a mole and was given to the participants. With this source code in hand,
each student-led team had one month to implement as many undetectable hardware Trojans
as possible. The Alpha device, augmented with Trojans, had to pass a set of functional tests,
use the same reference power, maintain the configuration memory usage, pass a brief code
inspection and be undetectable by a general user. With these requirements in mind, our team
from Iowa State University designed a wide set of applicable Trojans and performed a proof-
of-concept implementation using a provided Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) board.
Competition Details
The CSAW Embedded Systems Challenge began in September 2008, concluding a month
later in New York. Each team was given a BASYS development board [20] that contained
a Xilinx Spartan FPGA along with basic peripheral I/O. A basic schematic and picture of
our experimental setup can be seen in Figure A.1 and Figure A.2. The original design of the
Alpha required a PS/2 keyboard to be connected to the board for input and a VGA monitor
along with a serial connection for output. Four other buttons changed the state of the system.
Xilinx ISE 10.1 was used for development of the mixed-mode HDL code and for generating the
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Figure A.1: Diagram of components used from the BASYS board
Figure A.2: Experimental setup of BASYS board and peripherals
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bitstream for the FPGA. Modelsim SE 6.3 was used to simulate each Trojan. Additionally, our
team made use of an oscilloscope, power supply, multimeter, thermometer, HAM radio, and
custom circuits to verify the functionality of each Trojan.
In normal operation of the Alpha device, a message is typed in plaintext on the keyboard and
displayed on the VGA monitor. When the encrypt button on the board is pressed, the message
is sent through an AES-128 encryption block with the key selected by the 5 dip switches.1
Finally, when the transmit button is pressed, the system sends the encrypted message over the
serial port. The receiver of the message can then decrypt the message using the correct key.
For the purpose of this contest, a C program called encVerifier was provided in order to receive
and decrypt the message. For scoring the designs, the judges evaluated the completeness and
uniqueness of the Trojans along with their ability to be undetectable to a set of functional
tests, deviation in power consumption, deviation in bitstream size, and their ability to pass a
brief code inspection.
Implemented Attacks
Our team’s approach started with breaking a Trojan down into three areas of functionality
so that we could better target each area. The three categories, further explained below, are
thwarting the user’s plans, gaining extra knowledge, and exercising additional functionality:
1. Affecting the operation of the device either by making it function incorrectly or not
function at all. This form of attack could be seen as a Denial-of-Service (DOS) where
some subset of the functionality does not work as intended.
2. Leaking sensitive information that was not originally intended to be leaked from the
device. This could include allowing a malicious user to capture the plaintext messages,
the key used to encrypt those messages or any other information that would allow that
malicious user to have more knowledge of the system then they were originally intended
to have.
1There is an obvious cryptographic limitation in using 5 dip switches to select unique 128-bit keys, but
conceivably a more elegant model could be used for obtaining the key in a production environment.
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3. Utilizing the device for a function which it was not intended to be utilized. In this attack,
the device may function correctly, produce the correct outputs, and not leak information,
but it still may be used in a manner not intended by the original specifications.
Besides the functional aspects, a Trojan must be very well hidden to escape detection. The
existence of each attack must be undetectable during normal operation because its worth is
calculated by its ability to escape detection in addition to how well it meets the objectives of
the three categories listed above. On another level, the Trojan must be well hidden in the HDL
code before it gets a chance to be synthesized. Significant effort was spent in ensuring this
second method of hiding. Most of the details pertaining to how the attack was hidden in the
HDL code are not described in the following sections, as this deals primarily with specific wires
and modules that are not generalizable to other hardware Trojan circuits. In general, methods
such as extending bus widths, rerouting signals, utilizing naming conventions, decentralizing
the Trojan logic, writing misleading comments, and exploiting language nuances were used to
hide the various attacks described in this section.
A second consideration when designing the Trojans is the triggering of malicious function-
ality. Some of our Trojans, like those creating a DOS, should not be triggered immediately (or
they will fail validation tests) and instead should remain hidden. Other Trojans, such as the
RF-based information leakage attacks, Section 6.2 and Section 6.2, do not need to be triggered
because they remain ostensibly hidden as they operate. For the Trojans that require explicit
triggering, various methods can be used such as a timer, special sequence of keystrokes, special
packet sent to the board, etc. Each trigger has its disadvantages, but by decreasing the likeli-
hood of the triggering event occurring randomly, the Trojan has a better chance of remaining
hidden. For our Trojans which required triggering, we utilized a hardware counter to delay
activation, but this scheme could be easily switched in an manner independent of the Trojan’s
functionality.
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Figure A.3: RS232 message format
RS232 End Sequence Information Leakage
Explanation
We created three Trojans using the RS232 module. Although they all modify the transmis-
sion of data, they are fundamentally different, Figure A.3. The first Trojan takes advantage
of the message structure. The message structure begins with the key index used to decide
the key needed to decrypt the message. The key index is based on the dip switches found on
the physical board used to add some entropy to the master key. Following the key index is
the ciphertext, which is the original message encrypted using the AES-128 algorithm and the
private key. Finally, an ending sequence composed of fourteen bytes of 0xFF values is sent.
The program used to decrypt the messages on the receiver side, encVerifier, uses the key
index to know which key was used to encrypt the message and consequently which key needs
to be used to decrypt the message. This does trivialize the security, but provides a convenient
key distribution mechanism. The encVerifier program then reads the ciphertext, but since
it is of variable length, it needs the ending sequence to determine the end of the message.
The source code for the encVerifier program checks for the presence of five bytes of 0xFF in
the last available eight-byte segment. It then loops through the data from the last read byte
to the first read byte in the eight byte sequence and increments a counter for each byte of
0xFF observed. If at least five bytes of 0xFF have been read in the last eight byte segment,
the encVerifier program decrypts the message and displays it to the screen. A section of the
encVerifier program can be seen below:
whi le (STOP==FALSE)
{
//Read up to 8 bytes from the s e r i a l port
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rx = read ( fd , buf+totalRX , 8 ) ;
f o r ( i =0; i<rx ; i++)
{
i f ( buf [ totalRX−i ]==(unsigned char ) ’\\ x f f ’ )
{e++;}
}
i f ( e>4)
STOP=TRUE;
}
Exploiting the message structure, specifically the ending sequence, allows for two attacks.
The first attack places information after the transmission of the ending sequence, but still in
the original message. This attack is flexible in what information can be transmitted and the
amount of information that can be transmitted. We chose to leak the entire key at the end of
one message. Since the encVerifier program stops reading from the RS232 stream once it has
detected the ending sequence, extra information may be placed on the stream unnoticeable to
the verification program. A malicious program monitoring the stream would be able to read
past the ending sequence and receive the extra data placed on the end of the message.
Results
When this Trojan is enabled, the ending sequence is embedded with extra data. Using the
original encVerifier program it produced the expected output as it ignored the added informa-
tion:
> . / e n cVe r i f i e r
Waiting f o r t ransmi s s i on to begin . . . . .
Total bytes r e c e i v ed : 24
Ciphertext :
003BB579322F5F2E4AF7E9476D411DA83BFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
Using Key :
FB7915BDF1E5C8B84BB718DD34D73300
Pla in Text :
CSAW 2008 − I S U
68
When the malicious encVerifier program is run, it ignores the ciphertext message and all of
the 0xFF bytes of the ending sequence and reads the embedded key from the RS232 transmission
without prior knowledge of the key. The output from this program can easily be seen:
> . / encVer i f i e rTro j an1
Waiting f o r t ransmi s s i on to begin . . . . .
Total bytes r e c e i v ed : 60
Key :
FB 79 15 BD F1 E5 C8 B8 4B B7 18 DD 34 D7 33 00
Looking at the raw hex values from the RS232 stream reveals how the key was embedded.
The first line shows the original message format that the encVerifier program expects. The
second line continues right after the first in the transmission stream, but the encVerifier program
ignores that data allowing a malicious encVerifier to read past the point the original program
stopped reading:
00 3B B5 79 32 2F 5F 2E 4A F7 E9 47 6D 41 1D A8 3B FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
FB 79 15 BD F1 E5 C8 B8 4B B7 18 DD 34 D7 33 00 FF FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
RS232 End Sequence Information Leakage 2
Explanation
The second exploit to the end sequence takes advantage of the number of ending sequence
bytes that are sent. Since the ciphertext can be of variable length and the encVerifier program
checks for the presence of five bytes of 0xFF in the last eight byte segment, more than five bytes
of 0xFF must be sent, but fewer than the fourteen bytes of 0xFF that are sent by the reference
system. With a variable length message, there are eight possible locations within an eight byte
block where the end sequence can start. Each of these cases is depicted in Figure A.4, where
the fourteen byte wide table represents the fourteen bytes of 0xFF sent as the ending sequence
of a message transmission, the rows represent each of the eight cases, and the numbers in the
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Byte 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Case 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6
Case 2 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5
Case 3 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4
Case 4 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3
Case 5 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2
Case 6 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1
Case 7 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Case 8 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure A.4: Ending sequence cases. Gray shading differentiates eight bytes segments. White
indicates which bytes cause encVerifier to stop receiving.
Byte 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Case 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6
Case 2 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5
Case 3 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4
Case 4 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3
Case 5 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2
Case 6 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1
Case 7 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Case 8 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure A.5: Ending sequence cases. Same coloring as Figure A.4 but the dotted white cells
indicate where hidden messages could be placed.
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row represent the location of that byte in an eight byte segment. The two shades of gray show
adjacent messages and the white cells are the five bytes of 0xFF that the encVerifier program
uses to determine the end of a sequence. The fourteen bytes of 0xFF are more than enough
to create an ending sequence and other data can be contained in the original message size as
seen in Figure A.5. The markings in this figure are the same as Figure A.4 with the addition
of dotted white cells representing the five bytes of data that could be used for adding arbitrary
information. In the later figure, each case gives the encVerifier program sufficient amounts of
0xFF bytes for that program to correctly terminate, but it also allows for five bytes of arbitrary
data to be embedded in the stream.
Because of the AES-128 encryption scheme, the ciphertext is always in sixteen byte blocks.
Those sixteen bytes plus one byte of key index and the fourteen bytes of 0xFF for the end
sequence result in a message of (16 · n+ 14+ 1) bytes, where n is the number of cipher blocks.
This means that the message transmissions will always fall into case eight from Figure A.4
and Figure A.5. Now, instead of being limited to five bytes by case three, the first nine bytes
out of the fourteen bytes of 0xFF can be used to embed information as long as the last five
bytes read contain 0xFF. This method is more covert than Trojan 6.2 because the five bytes of
added data appear to be part of the ciphertext and not an extension to the end of the original
message. Both Trojans are invisible to the original encVerifier program and allow that program
to correctly operate in every instance.
Results
When the message “CSAW 2008 - ISU” is sent to the encVerifier program without modifying
the transmission stream, it produces the following output:
> . / e n cVe r i f i e r
Waiting f o r t ransmi s s i on to begin . . . . .
Total bytes r e c e i v ed : 24
Ciphertext :
003BB579322F5F2E4AF7E9476D411DA83BFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
Using Key :
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FB7915BDF1E5C8B84BB718DD34D73300
Pla in Text :
CSAW 2008 − I S U
Notice that the above output receives 24 bytes of data when actually 31 bytes of data were
sent. Reading the raw hex values from the RS232 port gives the following output. This is also
the expected output of the entire message format:
00 3B B5 79 32 2F 5F 2E 4A F7 E9 47 6D 41 1D A8 3B FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
When the extra nine bytes of data are embedded between the ciphertext and the ending
sequence, the encVerifier program still produces the same plaintext output. These bits of the
key that were transmitted appear as part of the ciphertext:
> . / e n cVe r i f i e r
Waiting f o r t ransmi s s i on to begin . . . . .
Total bytes r e c e i v ed : 31
Ciphertext :
003BB579322F5F2E4AF7E9476D411DA
83B00CCEB2CBB18EDD21DFFFFFFFFFF
Using Key :
FB7915BDF1E5C8B84BB718DD34D73300
Pla in Text :
CSAW 2008 − ISU
This time there are only five bytes of 0xFF since the rest of the nine bytes that were
previously 0xFF have been changed to parts of the key:
00 3B B5 79 32 2F 5F 2E 4A F7 E9 47 6D 41 1D A8 3B 00
CC EB 2C BB 18 ED D2 1D FF FF FF FF FF
RS232 Multiple Transmission Rates
Explanation
The third attack on the RS232 port takes a different approach and instead of exploiting the
message structure, it exploits the protocol itself. The RS232 protocol uses a single data wire
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31 2 4 5 6 7 8
Stop StopStartIdle Data
Mark
Space
Figure A.6: A valid RS232 message frame. The data bits are shown generically, but would
either be a mark or space.
for transmission. When the line is idle, it is a mark condition representing a negative voltage
and logic ‘1’. Likewise, when the line is pulled up to a positive voltage, logic ‘0’, it is a space
condition. The RS232 specification allows for various combinations of baud rates, data bits
in each packet, the number of stop bits, parity bits along with various other extensions. The
Alpha uses a 9600 baud rate transmission with eight data bits in each packet and a start and
stop bit corresponding to Figure A.6. The start bit must go from a mark to a space in order
for the receiver to recognize the beginning of the asynchronous transmission. Once the receiver
recognizes this condition, it can begin sampling the data bits at the agreed upon baud rate in
order to extract all of the data from the packet.
The Alpha board and receiver currently receive at 9600 baud, but both are also able to
transmit and receive data at faster rates. This Trojan crafts packets that are transmitted
at a faster rate, yet when viewed at the slower rate appear to be a valid transmission. In
this manner, two transmissions can be overlaid to allow two messages to simultaneously be
transmitted at different baud rates. In order to maintain transmission at two baud rates, both
transmissions must have complete frames including a start bit, stop bit(s), and data bits in
addition to looking similar to valid data when reading the same data at two different rates.
Another standard transmission rate is 115200 baud (twelve times faster than 9600 baud),
meaning that twelve bits are transmitted for every bit of data transmitted at the 9600 baud
rate. In order to keep from encountering framing errors, a complete packet must fit into these
twelve bits. This packet consists of an idle mark bit, a space start bit, eight data bits, and two
stop bits for a total of twelve bits. This packet of twelve bits must appear similar enough to the
constant ‘1’ bit transmitted at the same time at 9600 baud for the encVerifier program to still
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Stop StopStartIdle Data
Mark
Space
StopStartIdle Data
Mark
Space
9600 Baud
115200 Baud Key
Figure A.7: A valid RS232 frame at 115200 Baud can be shaped as a mark bit.
identify the 9600 baud rate transmission. There is also some inflexibility in which bits can be
shaped to look similar to the slower transmission since the initial mark bit and start bit must
remain fixed along with two stop bits. This means that if the 9600 baud rate transmission
is transmitting a mark bit, the 115200 baud rate transmission can match it on eleven out of
the twelve bits, but if it is a space, then the best that can be managed is nine out of twelve
bits. It turns out that both of these are acceptable to appear as the constant 9600 baud rate
value. These two scenarios can be seen in Figure A.7 and Figure A.8, respectively. In these
figures, the upper transmission packet is sent at 9600 baud and the lower transmission packet
at 115200 baud. Since the lower transmission is twelve times faster than the upper, the bottom
transmission frame represents a single bit of the upper transmission frame and has been shaped
to look as much like the bit from the upper frame that it is representing.
The transmissions of the mark bit at the slower rate can be used to embed one bit of
additional information, more specifically the key. By shaping the faster transmission to look
like the slower transmission, the mark bit can be more accurately represented, given that eleven
out of the twelve bits are the same. If one bit of information is embedded in the data section
of the faster transmission, then the resulting transmission would match either ten or eleven
out of the twelve bits, both of which are accurate enough be received without error at the
slower transmission rate. Our modified Alpha transmitter functions at the 115200 baud rate
sending out signals that look like the 9600 baud rate but with one bit of the key embedded
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Stop StopStartIdle Data
Mark
Space
StopStartIdle Data
Mark
Space
9600 Baud
115200 Baud
Figure A.8: A valid RS232 frame at 115200 Baud can be shaped as a space bit.
in each mark bit of the 9600 baud rate transmission. This allows the encVerifier program to
verify that the 9600 baud rate transmission contains the correct information, but a malicious
program listening at the 115200 baud rate can extract the key from the signal. The program
encVerifierTrojan3 verifies that the 115200 baud rate transmission does in fact contain the key.
Results
When this Trojan is enabled, it transmits both the expected data and the secret data as
the same signal. Using the original encVerifier program it produced the expected output:
> . / e n cVe r i f i e r
Waiting f o r t ransmi s s i on to begin . . . . .
Total bytes r e c e i v ed : 24
Ciphertext :
003BB579322F5F2E4AF7E947
6D411DA83BFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
Using Key :
FB7915BDF1E5C8B84BB718DD34D73300
Pla in Text :
CSAW 2008 − I S U
Reading the raw hex values from the RS232 port gives the following output. This is also
the expected output of the entire message format:
00 3B B5 79 32 2F 5F 2E 4A F7 E9 47 6D 41 1D A8 3B FF
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FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
When the malicious program, encVerifierTrojan3 is run, it listens at 115200 baud rate and
returns the leaked key without any prior knowledge of the system:
> . / encVer i f i e rTro j an3
Waiting f o r t ransmi s s i on to begin . . . . .
Key : FB7915BDF1E5C8B84BB718DD34D73300
Reading the raw hex values from the RS232 port also gives the expected output. The
115200 baud rate signal shapes its bits to appear as a ‘1’ or as a ‘0’, so the eight bits of data
sent at the faster baud rate should all be either zeros or ones, except for the bit of information
embedded in the transmission of the ones. In the transmission output, the eight bits of zeros
appear as 0x00 and the eight bits of ones as 0xFF. The 0xFE bytes represent a leaked zero and
the 0xFF bytes a leaked one.
FE 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FE FE FE 00 FE FE 00 FE
. . . FF 00 FE FE FF FF FE FE FF FF FF FE
Denial of Service
Explanation
The goal of this attack was to create a DOS which occurs during operation, that would
go unnoticed during normal device testing. The DOS attack can be implemented in many
ways, but at its core, it degrades the performance or validity of the Alpha device. In order to
implement a DOS, an acceptable location must be chosen such that it would remain hidden
during the verification tests. Finding an appropriate target is actually trivial since almost any
signal can be modified to produce incorrect output. The clock could be frozen to a value so
that the entire device quits functioning, the transmission of the data could be corrupted so
that it does not send correctly formatted RS232 frames, even the data read from the keyboard
could be skewed so that incorrect messages were transmitted.
Our specific implemented DOS Trojan attacks the key used to encrypt messages and ac-
complishes its goals of denying service and being well-hidden by making only minor important
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modifications to the code. It also is set on a timer so that it intermittently functions, switching
approximately every 3.58 minutes. Finally, the user in the field will not notice that the Trojan
is active since it only corrupts the ciphertext being sent out so that the intended receiver will
receive a ciphertext encrypted with a different key than they expect. The attack makes use
of a counter within the seven segment driver routine and a slight modification of the AES-128
routine. The seven segment driver already has a 12 bit counter running at 625 kHz. Adding 17
additional bits allows a 7.15 minute cycle time for the upper order bit. Adding a few more bits
would substantially increase the cycle time allowing it to pass validation tests. The upper order
bit is threaded through the seven segment driver as a fake enable signal which is connected to
the AES-128 core as a similar enable. Within the AES-128 module, this bit is XORed with one
of the key bits to corrupt approximately 50% of the ciphertext.
Results
From the user’s perspective, the operation is not changed but the data sent over the RS232
protocol is corrupted. As a test, a single ‘A’ character transmitted with a random encryption
key gives the serial output:
00 B6 97 60 D7 AA 40 62 03 B7 B1 20 4F 1D E9 25 39 FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
When the Trojan is active, the output is:
00 6E FA 67 DB c8 82 56 A6 C4 01 E7 8C 92 B5 B8 5C FF
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
XORing the two data streams gives:
00 d8 6d 07 0c 62 c2 34 A5 73 B0 C7 C3 8F 5C 9D 65
Showing that 62 bits out of 128 bits that were transmitted incorrectly (approaching the
expected error rate of 50%).
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Thermal Leakage
Explanation
Another interesting route for data leakage is through thermal transmission. In this attack,
the FPGA is systematically heated up or allowed to operate at its normal state to create a
binary code used for conveying information. This allows a malicious user to place a temperature
probe on the FPGA and monitor the temperature of the device to collect the data being leaked
(e.g. key bits). Even though this attack requires physical access to the FPGA, it has very
real applications. These could include a scenario where one of the Alpha devices is captured
allowing the captors to extract the key and decrypt all previous and future Alpha transmissions.
This attack would also work if a malicious user had temporary physical access to the FPGA
and was able to extract the key at that time.
The FPGA must be able to generate enough heat to be sensed by a temperature probe, on
the order of a couple of degrees Fahrenheit. As with most devices, on an FPGA, static and
dynamic current leakage account for the power dissipation and therefore heat generation. In
our usage, since the configuration is fixed at run-time, the static power remains very similar
between the original design and the modified thermal leakage design, and consequently most of
the power variation comes through the dynamic power dissipation. Dynamic power dissipation
can be modeled as Power = CEq × V cc2 × F where CEq is the total capacitive load, V cc is
the supply voltage and F is the switching frequency. In this Trojan, a series of output pins are
switched at 50MHz causing extra capacitive loads by driving the output pins. Also, since these
are driven at such a fast rate, extra power is dissipated when compared to the reference design
and the FPGA heats up. To communicate the key, we represented a ‘0’ as the temperature
of normal operation and a ‘1’ as the temperature of the heated up operation. A large counter
allows the shifting of the bits of the key to occur slowly, on the order of a minute, and provides
ample time for the FPGA to heat up and cool down. By sampling the temperature of the
FPGA at defined intervals, the key was obtained.
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Figure A.9: Hardware to generate the beep pattern
Figure A.10: Hardware to convert beeps to an audible tone
Results
By observing the temperature on the multimeter produced by the thermocouple at defined
time increments, the key was observed. This method successfully leaked out the key allowing
all of the bits to be verified with the expected result.
AM Transmission
Explanation
By modulating a pin on the FPGA, an RF signal can be generated and used to leak the key.
For the RF attacks, we utilized one of the pins of the socket. Since this socket is perpendicular
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to the ground plane of the board, it creates a far better antenna than the expansion header pins.
To allow this attack to be verified without any specialized equipment and also to demonstrate
the range capabilities, it was performed at two different frequencies. One transmission occurs
at 1560 KHz which can be received with an ordinary AM radio. The other attack transmits at
50 MHz and requires a specialized radio, such as a HAM radio, to receive the signal. The AM
transmission has an extremely short range, on the order of inches, as compared to the 50 MHz
transmission which can be received over 4 feet away. In both cases, if the pin was touched with
a finger or paper clip, the transmission range increased by several orders of magnitude. Since
the two attacks are effectively the same, the AM attack will be described in detail and only the
differences with the 50 MHz variant will be subsequently pointed out.
The data to be carried by the AM signal needs to be easily interpreted by a human. We
utilized a beep scheme where a single beep followed by a pause represents a ‘0’ and a double
beep followed by a pause represents a ‘1’. Figure A.9 shows the hardware necessary to generate
the sequence of beeps based on an input value. After the counter recycles, a shift register is
signaled to shift in the next bit of the master key. As can be seen in the figure, the top three
bits of the counter are used to form eight sequential states. The first state is always a beep,
followed by the second state which is always a pause. The third state will generate a beep only
if the data input is a one. The remaining states are used to generate the long pause between
beeps. For a person to be able to hear the beeps, the beep signal needs to be converted into
an audio tone and then modulated. Figure A.10 shows the logic to accomplish this. When the
beep line from Figure A.10 is a ‘1’, it is ANDed with bits fifteen and four of the counter. Bit
four toggles at a rate of 1560 KHz, the AM carrier, and bit fifteen toggles at a rate of 762Hz,
the audible tone. After this AND gate, a mux is used to decide if the transmitter is enabled.
Results
We viewed the signal generated by this Trojan with a standard oscilloscope, Figure A.11.
Figure A.11a shows the beeping sequence, where two beeps represent a ‘1’ and a single beep
represents a ‘0’. Figure A.11b represents the beginning of the 760Hz audio tone. Finally,
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Figure A.11c shows the RF carrier wave.
50MHz Transmission
Explanation
The 50MHz transmission was implemented to demonstrate how much the range can be
increased by increasing the frequency. We were able to decode the key from over 4 feet away.
This increased range has to do with the length of the pin being used to transmit. As this pin
length becomes closer to 1/4 wavelength of the carrier, the radiation pattern becomes better
and the amount of radiated energy increases. If we transmitted at even higher frequencies
such as 300MHz, the distance should increase, but will be capped as we approach microwave
frequencies due to the uncorrected parasitics on the board. Instead of using bit 4 of the baud
rate counter, this Trojan uses the 50MHz board clock to modulate the data.
Results
When this Trojan was viewed with an oscilloscope, the results looked almost identical to
Figure A.11 except for the change in frequency. Using a HAM radio, the signal was audibly
picked up while standing in the room.
LED Transmission
Explanation
The same beep pattern as the RF Trojan was used to leak the key with a high frequency
blinking LED. This time, instead of using an audible tone, two different blink rates were used.
The LED blinks at 1 KHz to indicate a beep and at 2 KHz to indicate silence. In order to make
it less noticeable to the user, the LED constantly blinks at a high frequency preventing the
intensity from changing when it is switched into transmission mode. The difference between
the LED blinking at 1 KHz and 2 KHz is not noticeable to the human eye simply by observing
the LED. A separate circuit with a photodiode and band pass filter was then used to detect
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(a) Beeping Pattern
(b) 760Hz audio tone
(c) RF carrier wave
Figure A.11: Measured patterns for RF signal leakage attack
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the blinking pattern. Once detected, the circuit turns its own LED which blinks exactly as the
beeps are heard by a person using the RF Trojans.
Results
This Trojan requires a specialized circuit to view the transmission by shifting the frequencies
in the LED. This can be seen by placing the circuit near the LED that is transmitting and
reading the values by observing the LED of the external circuit. Using the external circuit held
a few inches from the Alpha device, the key was received.
Considered Attacks
The following Trojans were considered, but not implemented in the final submission. For
some of these Trojans, steps were made to implement them, but either their prohibitively high
difficulty, infeasibility, potentially destructive nature or our lack of time and resources prevented
us from implementing them. The following short descriptions provide a high-level conceptual
approach to the these attacks.
Keyboard LED
Explanation
The Keyboard LED Trojan is similar to the LED transmission but follows a different proto-
col. Since the transmission of information between the keyboard and the host device is relatively
slow, it is not possible to blink the keyboard LED at a rate fast enough to be invisible to the
eye as Trojan 6.2 does. Instead, a different scheme must be used where one of the LEDs is
kept lit for the majority of the time and then only momentarily turned off and back on again.
This could be used to transmit data where the light, sampled at defined intervals, transmits
binary data. Preliminary tests showed that it was possible to flicker a keyboard LED such that
it was almost impossible to see when staring directly at it and would be less noticeable when
not paying specific attention to the LED.
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Blinking Cursor
Explanation
Similar to the above LED Trojans, the cursor on the VGA screen blinks at a predefined
rate. This rate could be slightly altered such that it leaks information. By varying the rate
at which the cursor blinks, the key could be extracted while still remaining hidden from the
user. This attack would require access to the device, either if the Alpha was captured or if a
malicious user was in close proximity to the device. This Trojan is a bit stealthier than having
to physically access the FPGA (to extract the temperature information, for example) since the
VGA monitor is an external device that is meant to be visible to the user.
VGA Sync
Explanation
Because of how the horizontal and vertical syncs are generated by the BASYS VGA con-
troller, a small gap is created. The gap can be used to hide data in the VGA signal such that it
does not affect the output as displayed on the monitor. A specialized decoder circuit that had
access to the VGA signal would need to extract the information from the small gap to recreate
the key.
Change Bitstream on PROM
Explanation
The Cypress chip on the BASYS board is used for implementing the Universal Serial Bus
(USB) protocol and incorporates a fully programmable microcontroller. Because USB can be
used to program the FPGA the Cypress chip has connections to the Erasable Programmable
Read Only Memory (EPROM) used to store the FPGA configuration. A Trojan implemented
on the Cypress chip using the embedded microcontroller could erase the EPROM memory after
some time delay causing a permanent DOS attack that can only be fixed by reprogramming
the entire board. To implement a Trojan on the Cypress chip, firmware must be downloaded
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through the USB and can be saved in the EPROM for the Cypress chip. A software virus could
be developed that will install the Trojan when the BASYS board is connected by USB to an
infected computer.
Destruction
Explanation
Another idea for a DOS attack was to physically destroy the device when triggered. At-
tempts were made to get the device to self-destruct, but none were successful. The means to
this attack varied significantly, and included generating enough heat to be damaging, creating
HDL code or tweaking the Xilinx ISE synthesis settings such that it would generate a bitstream
that was self-destructive. Some progress was made in generating heat and was successfully im-
plemented as a key leakage attack, but not enough heat was able to be generated that would
damage the FPGA. Other attempts were made to write self-damaging HDL code, but no feasi-
ble structure could be created that violated safe FPGA configurations. Although none of these
destructive Trojans were implemented given the constraints of the CSAW contest, small gains
toward their realization were made.
Store One Bit
Explanation
Each DOS attack, save the destruction of the FPGA, is temporary in that a reset of the
bitstream would disable the Trojan. The Trojan would then have to be retriggered in order
to begin functioning, which might not be very challenging if it were on a timer for instance,
but could be difficult if it took a more elaborate triggering mechanism to reinstate the Trojan.
But, if one bit of persistent data could be stored in the Alpha, then that bit could be set
upon successful triggering of the Trojan and then used to reinstate the Trojan upon each reset.
Significant effort was put forth to find a way to store one bit of data, but no way was successfully
found. Attempts were made to communicate with the PROM from the FPGA and also with
the Cypress chip used for the USB which had its own PROM. It was discovered that it was not
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Table A.1: The variance in power from the reference design for each of the states of the eight
Trojans
Ref T1 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8
mA ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Reset 146.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 65.4 0.7 0.7 0.8
Init Min 156.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 22.8 1.6 0.6 1.0
Init Max 185.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 22.5 0.7 0.7 0.7
Encrypt 144.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 00.0 0.0 0.1 0.5
Transmit 153.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 22.2 1.0 0.8 1.2
possible to write directly to the Cypress PROM, but instead, a USB device plugged into the
USB port of the board was required in order to change that PROM.
Judging
We presented our hardware Trojans at CSAW 2008 to a panel of industry and academic
judges along with the other contest entrants. The judges evaluated the Trojans on the their use
of power, variance in bitstream size, stealth, and novelty. Table A.1 shows each Trojan for the
given states of the system and how much their power usage varies from the reference design.
The measurements were made using a bench multimeter in series with the power supply. Within
a 20 minute window, these values varied by 0.5mA from the same measurement a few minutes
earlier. It should be noted that Trojan T5, Section 6.2, requires large amounts of power by the
nature of its design. In order to heat up the FPGA, heat needs to be generated by consuming
more power. The bitstreams for each of the designs augmented with the Trojans matched the
size of the original reference design and each Trojan was well hidden in both the source code
and by inspection of the operating device. Using these metrics, our team was awarded first
place.
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